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Reclaiming Our Future: International
Efforts to Eliminate the Threat of
Persistent Organic Pollutants
By ELIZABETH B. BALDWIN*
I. Introduction
Evidence is mounting that certain types of chemicals known as per-
sistent organic pollutants ("POPs") are causing increasingly detrimental
health and environmental effects around the world.' The international
community has become concerned in recent years about the severity of
the adverse effects of POPs and their continued global distribution. Sci-
entists link POPs not only to increased incidences of cancer in humans
and wildlife, but also to birth defects, compromised immune systems,
hormonal abnormalities, and neurological defects.2 Because POPs are
transported by wind, ocean currents, and by migrating wildlife, the po-
tential effects of POPs are global in scope.3
POPs are produced or released during industrial processes which
utilize chlorine, or the combustion of waste and certain fuels, or by the
manufacture, use, and storage of chemicals such as organochlorine pesti-
* Member of the Class of 1998. B.A. Oberlin College, 1992. The author ishes to
thank Marcia Ishii-Eiteman and the staff at the Pesticide Action Network North America
Regional Center for their patience, encouragement, and invaluable assistance.
1. Persistent organic pollutants are toxic organic compounds that break down very
slowly in the environment and accumulate in the tissues of living organisms. Global
Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based
Activities, United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"), at 37-38, U.N. Doc.
UNEP (OCA)/LBAfIG.2/7 (1995) [hereinafter "Global Programme of Action"];
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS MEETING ON PERSIEN ORGANIC POLLuTANTS: TowARDs
GLOBAL ACTION, MEETING STATEMENT 2 (June 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
"VANcoUvER MEarING STATEMENT"]; PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK AsIA AND THE
PACIFC, POPs SuMMARY 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter'"POPs SUMMARY"].
2. THO CoLBoRN Er AL, OUR STOLEN Futnm- ARE WE T MEuaN' IN OuR FoTazr=,
INL GENcE, AND SURvivAL? A SCIENIFC DETECIVE STORY 26, 154-55, 180-82, 187-91
(1996); POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
3. Global Programme of Action, supra note 1, at 38; COMON, supra note 2, at
105; POPs SUMhARY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
cides.4 Examples of POPs include DDT, chlordane, toxaphene, endosul-
fan, and various other pesticides, as well as industrial products (PCBs)
and byproducts (dioxins and furans). 5
Various groups have begun an effort to formulate a uniform inter-
national policy to deal with the worldwide health and environmental
problems posed by POPs. These groups argue that a binding interna-
tional instrument is needed to stop the production and use of certain
POPs. In 1998, governments from around the world will almost certainly
begin formal negotiation of a global legally binding instrument aimed at
the eventual worldwide ban on production and use of POPs. This Note
(1) briefly reviews the mounting evidence concerning the harmful effects
of POPs; (2) discusses those international efforts that have attempted to
formulate an international agreement to limit the spread of POPs; (3)
compares the current POPs negotiations to the circumstances surround-
ing the creation of the Montreal Protocol; and (4) summarizes outstand-
ing issues and identifies possible impediments to reaching a global con-
sensus and effectively implementing an agreement on POPS.
I. Persistent Organic Pollutants
A. Evidence of POPs' Global Effects
POPs are synthetic chemicals that resist breakdown and accumulate
in human body fat.6 Once absorbed by a living organism or sprayed on a
4. Global Programme of Action, supra note 1, at 38; POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1,
at 1; Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, Pesticide Action Network North America, Persistent Organic
Pollutants: A Brief Overview of International Activities 1 (1996) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
5. POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1-2. Polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") are a
family of chemicals, introduced in 1929, used in many industrial processes (particularly
in the electrical industry) and consumer products. Evidence of their toxic effects began
to emerge in 1936, and eventually PCBs were found to accumulate and resist breakdown
in the environment. In 1976, the United States and, eventually, other industrial countries
banned the manufacture of PCBs. However, the ban did not address existing PCBs
which had already contaminated the environment after five decades cf production, nor
did it prohibit certain continued uses of PCBs. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 89-91. See
infra text accompanying notes 146-61 for discussion of dioxins and furans.
6. Problems With Persistent Organic Pollutants-Towards Better Alternatives, In-
tergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, at 3, IFCS/EXP.POPs.13 (June 6, 1996)
(prepared by Consumers International et al., presented at the Intergovernmental Forum
(Vol. 20:855
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crop, these chemicals quickly pass through the food chain, increasing
their concentration in each transfer.7 Pesticides in particular are a "spe-
cial class" of POPs in that they are designed to poison and kill and are
intentionally dispersed into the environment.8 Many POPs are highly
toxic, cause certain forms of cancer, or disrupt hormonal development.9
Years ago, scientific studies linked synthetic chemicals to cancer in
wildlife and humans. 10 More recent animal research has revealed an
even greater variety of detrimental effects that POPs cause within the
environment. These effects include: (1) sterility in bald eagles; (2) al-
tered nesting patterns and population declines in birds exposed to DDT;
(3) severe deformities of chicks exposed to dioxin; (4) reproductive fail-
ures of mink, whales, and other wildlife; (5) decline in otter population;
(6) genital abnormalities in alligators; and (7) a plague among Mediter-
ranean dolphins exposed to PCBs.11 These harmful effects are not lim-
ited to wildlife but can harm the human species as well, as indicated by
studies documenting genital abnormalities and decreases in fertility
among humans.1
2
on Chemical Safety ("IFCS") Experts Meeting on POPs, Manila, Philippines, June 17-
19, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Better Alternatives"]; COLBORN, supra note
2, at 26.
7. RACHEL CARSON, SmENT SPRING 22-23, 46-49 (1962); COLBORN, supra note 2, at
26-27, 106-08, 154, 156; POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1.
8. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 138; Robert L. Paarlberg, Managing Pesticide Use in
Developing Countries, in INSTrrtmONS FOR THE EARTH 309, 309-10 (Peter M. Haas et al.
eds., 1993).
9. CARSON, supra note 7, at 23-27 (discussing toxicity of chlordane, heptachlor,
dieldrin, aldrin, and endrin, all POPs pesticides); POPS SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1;
Marion Moses, Pesticides, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 479, 482-83
(J.M. Last & R.B. Wallace eds., 13th ed. 1992) (describing toxicology of "chlorinated
hydrocarbon" (organochlorine) pesticides) [hereinafter "Pesticides"]. For a recent and
comprehensive narrative regarding connections between synthetic chemicals and cancer,
see generally SANDRA STENGRAER, LiviNG DOWNSTREAM: AN ECOLOGisT LOOKS AT
CANCER AND THE ENVORNMENT (1997).
10. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 15-16, 19, 200-01; STEiNGRABER, supra note 9, at
110.
11. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 1-4, 6-10, 12, 14, 144-47; see also STEiNGRABER, st-
pra note 9, at 132-34 (noting links between DDT, PCBs, chlordane, and toxaphene (all
POPs) and tumors and reproductive problems in beluga whales).
12. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 172-79, 232-34. Animal research on the effects of
POPs is directly relevant to determining how POPs may affect humans. Scientists have
already determined, for example, that parallels exist across species, including humans, in
endocrine systems and hormonal effects. Thus, criticism of animal studies regarding
1997]
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POPs have been known to cause harm from one generation to the
next (e.g., a woman who is exposed to POPs may not suffer any symp-
toms but her exposure may affect the hormonal development of her child
before it is born).' 3 This ability to disrupt the human endocrine system
has led to POPs being labeled "endocrine disrupters.' 4 Endocrine dis-
ruption caused by synthetic chemical residues in humans has been shown
to lead to the following: 15 (1) low fertility rates and sperm counts; (2)
behavioral changes; (3) impairments in learning ability; (4) disrupted
neurological development; (5) genital abnormalities; (6) certain hor-
mone-related forms of cancer, including breast, testicular, and prostate
cancers; 16 (7) immune system disruption; (8) skewed hormone ratios; (9)
internal reproductive organ disruption; (10) inadequate levels of thyroid
hormone, which plays a role in reproduction and the development of
healthy offspring; (11) ectopic (tubal) pregnancies; (12) endometriosis (a
POPs has even less viability than similar attacks on animal studies regarcing cancer. Id.
at 86, 110, 168-69, 238. The complexities of cancer cells still leave much to be deter-
mined regarding the effects on laboratory animals as opposed to humans. Id. In short,
scientists have more knowledge regarding how hormones work than how cancer cells
work. Id.
13. CARSON, supra note 7, at 23; CoLBoRN, supra note 2, at 26-28.
14. Scientists have identified at least 51 synthetic chemicals that disrupt the endo-
crine system, one of the human body's fundamental networks. The endocrine system cir-
culates messages between various glands, organs, and tissues to regulate hormone levels.
COLBORN, supra note 2, at 32-33, 81. See also WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE
INTERNATIONAL, A FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PHASE-OUT AND ELIMINATION OF
POPs 6-7, Appendix B (1996) (providing examples of endocrine disruption) [hereinafter
"WWF PosITIoN PAPER"]. Additionally, many forms of cancer are related to hormone
regulation, and thus, endocrine disruption is directly relevant to cancer research as well.
STEINGRABER, supra note 9, at 110-11. Endocrine disruption continues to be a contro-
versial area of scientific research. See generally COLBORN, supra note 2. As stated by a
leading scientist in this field,
Exposure to a hormone-disrupting chemical before birth does not prcduce just a
single clear-cut effect .... A foreign chemical can derail development in a va-
riety of ways that will become evident at different times. For exanple, a boy
exposed before birth to chemicals that mimic estrogen may have undescended
testicles at birth, a low sperm count at puberty, or testicular cancer in middle
age because of this prenatal hormone disruption. These are effects that manifest
themselves in many shades of gray rather than in the black-and-white distinc-
tions made between health and illness.
Id. at 207.
15. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 72 (diagramming hormonal effects of synthetic chemi-
cals).
16. Id. at 182-86, 201.
[Vol. 20:855
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disease which is a leading cause of infertility in women); and (13) mis-
carriages.
17
Scientific research regarding DES led to a greater understanding of
the manner in which POPs can harm humans. This research found:'
8
1. Drugs and chemicals that have little effect on an adult can cause
serious and permanent damage to that adult's baby during its prenatal
development.
2. Healthy embryonic development is dependent on a delicate bal-
ance of hormones which exists during prenatal development. During
certain critical stages, even the slightest change in a hormonal level can
interfere with this delicate balance and thereby harm the fetus.'
9
3. The human body can mistake a man-made chemical for a hor-
mone.
4. Invisible damage to cells and tissue, although not as dramatic as
visible birth defects (such as missing limbs), can have lifelong impact
and undermine an individual's potential for survival. 20
5. Chemicals can enter the placenta and disrupt prenatal develop-
ment, having potentially serious effects that might not be evident until
decades later.21 Such delayed, long-term effects might not emerge until
the child reaches puberty or even adulthood.
17. I at 172-76, 178-82.
18. Id. at 66-67. DES (diethylstilbestrol) was introduced in 1938, and thereafter,
doctors widely prescribed it for pregnant women to prevent miscarriages and to promote
the strength and health of the unborn baby. Doctors also prescribed DES to treat a host
of other symptoms, and farmers used it in animal feed to fatten their livestock. Id. at 48.
By 1971, scientists had linked DES taken by pregnant women to cancer in their adult
daughters. Id. at 52, 55. DES is now recognized as a hormone mimicker. Id. at 72-73.
For a description of damage caused by DES, see id. at 55-66.
19. See also STEINGRABER, supra note 9, at 142-43 (noting that slight environmental
changes caused by chemicals can affect fetal development of turtles, including sex de-
termination).
20. One scientist notes that "[u]ntil DES, most scientists thought a drug was safe unless it
caused immediate and obvious malformations. They found it hard to believe that something
could have a serious long-term impact without causing any outwardly visible birth defects."
COLBORN, supra note 2, at 53.
21. See also CARSON, supra note 7, at 23 (discussing DDT's ability to "cross the bar-
rier of the placenta, the traditional protective shield between the embryo and harmful
substances in the mother's body.").
19971
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Scientists have discovered that numerous chemicals are hormone
disrupters. 22 The difference between natural and synthetic hormone dis-
rupters lies in their persistence. Natural hormone disrup:ers, such as
plant estrogens, may be eliminated from the body within ona day. How-
ever, the human body cannot break down synthetic hormone disrupters;
they accumulate in body tissue, ensuring long-term exposure.23
Although scientific evidence regarding POPs is far frora complete,
24
the tremendous weight of evidence points to the potential for POPs to
harm each of us, our children, grandchildren, and generations to come.
Whether the harm caused by POPs manifests itself through a child's de-
formity or learning disability, infertility, or cancer, POPs pose a major
threat to biodiversity on the planet.2
B. Prevalence of POP Contamination
Exposure to POPs began with the onset of the chemical age over
half a century ago and has increased steadily until the present.26 The use
of POPs has grown because chemicals such as pesticides and fertilizers
promote short-term economic efficiency by increasing agricultural pro-
duction at a relatively low cost.27 The sale and distribution of chemicals
are also big business. For example, the world market in pesticides
amounted to five billion pounds in 1989 and included 1,600 chemicals.28
22. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 81. At least forty synthetic chemicals are capable of mim-
icking the hormone estrogen. STEINGRABER, supra note 9, at 111.
23. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 82.
24. For example, scientists are in the process of discovering additional effects that
POPs have on the migratory patterns of birds. Id. at 164, 170.
25. See id. at 165-66.
26. Id. at 138, 170-71.
27. See generally CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION OF PENANG, PESTICIDE PROBLEMS,
LEGISLATION AND CONSUMER ACTION IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE MALAYSIAN EXPERIENCE
(1991) [hereinafter "PESTICIDE PROBLEMS"]; LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS
FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORT
BOOM (1995) [hereinafter "BITTERSWEET HARVESTS"]; DAVID WEIR & MARK SCHAPIRO,
CIRCLE OF POISON (1981) [hereinafter "CIRCLE OF POISON"] (all discussing the cyclical
pattern of pesticide use). See Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 4-5 for a summary of
the current uses for POPs. But see Lori Ann Thrupp, New Harvests, Old Problems:
Feeding the Global Supermarket, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER, Sept. 1995, at 1, 4-6
(describing adverse economic, social, and environmental impacts of heavy pesticide use
in less developed countries ("LDCs")) [hereinafter "New Harvests"].
28. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 138.
[Vol. 20:855
Reclaiming Our Future
In 1993, total sales of the top twelve agrochemical companies worldwide
reached over nineteen billion dollars.29 Worldwide use is still increas-
ing, particularly in developing countries.
30
The need for global action against POPs is highlighted by the fact
that POPs which are banned in one locale often find their way to an-
other.31  Between 1991 and 1994, the United States exported at least
fifty-eight million pounds of pesticides that had been banned, canceled,
or voluntarily suspended for use in the United States, including ninety-
six tons of DDT in 1991 alone.32 In 1991, exports from the United States
29. THE PESTICIDES TRUST, THE PESTICIDE TRAIL: THE IMPACT OF TRADE CONTROLS
ON REDUCING PESTICIDE HAZARDs IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (Barbara Dinham ed.,
1995) [hereinafter "THE PESTICIDE TRAIL"].
30. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 138; THE PESTICIDETRAIL, supra note 29, at 23-36 (re-
viewing the global pesticide market); see generally DR. G. GOUtsTON, CROP PROTEcTIO.4
IN LATIN AMERICA (1996) (analyzing the pesticide markets in Latin America). See also
STEINGRABER, supra note 9, at 161-67 (describing domestic regulation of pesticides, or the lack
thereof, in the United States).
31. See Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 5; PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, supra note 27,
at 7-9; Carl Smith, Countries Accept "Dirty Dozen" Pesticides from U.S. Shippers De-
spite National Bans, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER, Sept. 1995, at 3, 17 (noting the
export of banned pesticides from industrialized countries to LDCs).
32. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 110; Smith, supra note 31, at 3. The history of DDT use
provides a useful example of the growth of POPs. DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) is
an insecticide which was hailed as a miracle when introduced in 1938. Widespread use of
DDT in the United States began in 1947. Decades later, in 1972, recognition of DDT as a can-
cer-causing chemical led to severe restrictions on its use in the United States. COLBoRN, supra
note 2, at 68-70, 198-202. Significant amounts of DDT continue to be exported by chemical
companies in developed countries to LDCs. Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 5; Ishii-
Eiteman, supra note 4, at 1. DDT is used widely in LDCs such as Indonesia to eradicate ma-
laria and other mosquito-transmitted diseases. See Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 4-5, 19-
20; PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 49; see also Position Paper presented to the World
Health Assembly by Pesticide Action Network and Consumers International (Jan. 1997) (pre-
sented to the World Health Assembly 99th Executive Board, Provisional Agenda Item 5.4, Jan.
13-17, 1997) (stating that the World Health Organization regards DDT as a chemical that is
necessary for use in the control of insect-bome diseases) [hereinafter "PANICI Position Pa-
per"]. Because of this one redeeming use for this particular POP, language providing for an
exception to a ban on DDT, despite its toxicity, may be considered by the drafters of the POPs
agreement. See IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants Meeting
Final Report, Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, at 10,
IFCSIWG.POPs/REPORT.1 (July 1, 1996) [hereinafter "Final Report"]. Some LDCs
have halted their use of DDT, and others are in the process of phasing it out while alter-
natives are introduced. PAN/Cl Position Paper, supra. Environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs") such as Pesticide Action Network ("PAN") advo-
cate a rapid phaseout of this toxic pesticide. Id. These NGOs (PAN, World Wide Fund
19971
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included fifty-five tons per day of compounds known to be endocrine
disrupters.33
C. Areas of Controversy
Because so many POPs are used globally and vast numbers of new
synthetic chemicals continue to be created, it is very difficult for scien-
tists to isolate a single POP as the cause of a particular symptom. 34 POPs
often act in combination. Indeed, a fully inclusive list of all POPs has
yet to be compiled, and considerable controversy surrounds the issue of
which chemicals should be included on the list of subst;Mces to be
banned.36
Furthermore, some critics argue that synthetic POPs pose no danger
to humans because humans have adapted to certain natural (non-
synthetic) hormone disrupters. 37 A leading scientist responds that "while
we may have evolved ways to coexist with [natural hormone disrupting]
compounds, this does not mean they are harmless .... Even naturally
occurring hormone mimics can disrupt development of the unborn or
young children." 38 Furthermore, as noted above, synthetic POPs pose an
even greater hazard than natural compounds because they can persist in
the body for years, while plant estrogens might be eliminated within a
day.
39
Some critics also question the relevance of DES studies to the POPs
issue because of the very high doses of DES given to pregnant women
for Nature, and Consumers International) plan to prepare a report regarding DDT to pre-
sent to the POPs Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee ("INC") when it is formed in
1998. See Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane, Pesticide Action Network Asia and
the Pacific, to Pesticide Action Network North America 4 (Mar. 17, 1997) (on file with
author).
33. Smith, supra note 31, at 3; see also COLBORN, supra note 2, at 138 (providing statis-
tics of pesticide production and export).
34. COLBoRN, supra note 2, at 110, 137-41 (asserting that contamination from POPs is
global and well documented), 18 (pointing out that new chemicals are created much faster than
toxicologists can demonstrate links between individual chemicals and cancer).
35. Id. at 178.
36. Id. at 78, 81, 178; see infra text accompanying notes 127-45.
37. CoLBoRN, supra note 2, at 82.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 81-82.
(Vol. 20:855
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and to laboratory animals in experiments. 4° On the other hand, recent
studies utilizing very low doses of DES have produced results similar to
those of studies in which large doses were applied.41
Finally, critics question the accuracy of using animal studies to
forecast dangers posed to humans. Opponents note that it is well estab-
lished that similarities in endocrine systems have existed across many
species throughout evolution.42 Therefore, the link between animals and
humans in this area cannot be ignored. As Rachel Carson noted over
thirty years ago, "in nature nothing exists alone .... Man, however
much he may like to pretend the contrary, is part of nature."
43
M. International Efforts
A. Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro, June 1992
The first international forum which recognized the need to address
the harmful effects of POPs was the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development ("UNCED") Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil in June 1992 ("Rio Earth Summit"). At that summit, more than
170 governments agreed to work to eliminate the emissions and dis-
charge of certain synthetic compounds. 44 Among the results of the Rio
Earth Summit, one written agenda entitled "Environmentally Sound
Management of Toxic Chemicals" (Chapter 19 of Agenda 21) became
40. Id. at 169.
41. Id. at 169-70. While effects increase with dosage up to a point, at that point, the
response to DES diminishes as the dose increases. Id.
42. Id. at 74, 110, 167-69. Animal studies regarding hormone effects offer a much
higher degree of certainty than cancer studies. Scientists have extensive knowledge of
how hormones work, whereas knowledge regarding cancer cells is limited. Id. at 86,
110, 168-69; see supra note 12.
43. CARSON, supra note 7, at 51, 188.
44. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBUC INFORMATION, AGENDA 21: PROGRAME OF AcriON FOR
SUSTANABLE DEvELOPMENT, June 3-14, 1992, para. 17.28 (d)-(e), reprinted in AGENDA
21: THE UNrrED NATIONS PROGRAMME OF AcTION FROM Rio, at 151, U.N. Sales No.
E.93.I.11 (1993) [hereinafter "AGENDA 21"]; Response Strategies for Reduc-
ing/Eliminating Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 3 (June 10, 1996) (discus-
sion paper presented by the Nordic Countries and the United States at the IFCS meeting
in Manila, Philippines, June 21-22, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter "Response
Strategies"]; see Introductory Note at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 814, 815 (1992).
19971
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the primary instrument for coordinating international efforts regarding
chemicals. 45 The Rio Earth Summit's Agenda 21 established two
mechanisms to promote and implement provisions regarding chemical
safety: (1) the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety ("IFCS");
and (2) the Inter-Organisational Programme for the Sound Management
of Chemicals ("IOMC"). 46 Additionally, at the Rio Earth Summit, the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") was authorized to
convene a global conference regarding POPs.47
B. UNEP Governing Council Meeting, 1995
In May 1995, the UNEP Governing Council's Decision 18/32 es-
tablished a procedure to expeditiously address the need for global action
on POPs.48 Specifically, Decision 18/32 requested that a series of meet-
ings of experts and an ad hoc working group be convened by the IOMC,
the International Programme on Chemical Safety ("IPCS'), and the
IFCS. 49 These groups were instructed to "assess realistic response
strategies, policies and mechanisms for reducing and/or eliminating
45. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, ch. 19, at 186-96; Response Strategis, supra note
44, at 5. The June 1996 Final Report of the IFCS Ad Hoc Working Grou on POPs ac-
knowledges that the provisions of Chapter 19 of Agenda 21 "should also be taken into
account." Final Report, supra note 32, at 6.
46. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, paras. 19.29, 19.75-19.76, at 189, 196; see Response
Strategies, supra note 44, at 5. The IFCS consists of senior government officials and in-
volves active participation of NGOs. Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 5. The In-
ter-Organization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals ("IOMC") con-
sists of international organizations including UNEP, the World Health Organization
("WHO"), the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations ("FAO")
and plays a coordinating role for the work of these organizations involving Agenda 21, in
particular as it relates to chemical safety issues. Id. "Neither the IFCS :nor the IOMC
has the authority to convene negotiations on a legally-binding convention, although they
can offer recommendations about the form and content of a convention rand coordinate
the development of technical input into it." Id. at 6.
47. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 17.26, at 151.
48. Decision 18/32, Persistent Organic Pollutants, U.N. Environme t Programme
Governing Council, 18th Sess., 9th mtg. at 1-2 (May 25, 1995), (visited Aug. 16, 1997)
available in <http://irptc.unep.chlpops/indxhtms/gc1832en.html> [hereinafter "Decision
18/32"]; see Final Report, supra note 32, at 1; GREENPEACE, POPs BACKGROUNDER 1
(1996) [hereinafter "POPs BACKGROUNDER"]; Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 4.
49. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 1; see Final Report, supra note 32, at 3, 5, 8.
[Vol. 20:855
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emissions, discharges and losses of persistent organic pollutants."'
' 4
They were expected to review existing information on the health and en-
vironmental impacts; analyze sources, the ways POPs spread through the
environment, and global dissemination; evaluate availability of alterna-
tives and substitutes; and develop realistic proposals for international
action.51 UNEP's Governing Council also instructed the groups to rec-
ommend actions to be taken by the UNEP Governing Council and the
World Health Assembly to develop an international legal mechanism to
control POPs.
5 2
UNEP intended for the above described process to address twelve
POPs initially, those comprising the "short list" of POPs established by
the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe ("ECE") Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution ("LRTAP").5 The short list
of twelve POPs (known as the "dirty dozen") identified for initial action
includes the following: aldrin, dieldrin, DDT, endrin, chlordane, hepta-
chlor, hexachlorobenzene, mirex, toxaphene, dioxins, furans, and
PCBs.
54
C. IFCS Meetings, 1995-1996
The IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group met on March 9, 1996, in Can-
berra, Australia and on June 21-22, 1996, in Manila, Philippines.5 s The
IFCS Experts met in Vancouver, British Columbia in June 1995 and in
Manila, Philippines on June 17-19, 1996.56 The Manila meetings re-
garding POPs involved more than 100 government delegates, non-
50. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 2; see Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 4.
51. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 1-2; see Response Strategies, supra note 44, at
4.
52. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 2; see Final Report, supra note 32, at 2; Re-
sponse Strategies, supra note 44, at 4. Decision 18/32 points to a "possible decision [by
the UNEP Governing Council] regarding an appropriate international legal mechanism"
to phase out POPs. Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 4.
53. Final Report, supra note 32, at 5-6. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83 for
discussion of LRTAP.
54. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 1 n.60; POPs BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48,
at 1.
55. Final Report, supra note 32, at 3,5; POPs BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 1.
56. Final Report, supra note 32, at 4-5; VANCOUVER MEETING STATEMENT, supra
note 1, at 1, 12.
1997]
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governmental organizations ("NGOs"), 57 industry representatives, and
intergovernmental organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations ("FAO"), the World Health Organiza-
tion ("WHO"), and the United Nations Development Programme. At the
conclusion of the IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group meeting, a Final Report
was adopted and forwarded to UNEP for action at its Governing Council
meeting in January-February 1997.58
The Final Report recommended that the following actions be
taken:5 9
(1) expedite development of a global legally binding instrument;
(2) promptly establish an expert group comprised of both NGOs and
intergovernmental organizations to develop science-based criteria and a
procedure for identifying additional POPs as candidates for international
action;
(3) invite non-ECE members to participate in the ECE LRTAP de-
velopment of a protocol on POPs;
(4) establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee ("INC")
at the UNEP Governing Council; this INC should then establish an "Ex-
pert Group" to develop a process for defining criteria to add to the short
list of POPs. The Expert Group should have expertise in scientific and
socioeconomic analysis, with attention to ecosystems, biodiversity, and
special needs of developing countries;
(5) develop appropriate international and regional groups to help
developing countries meet a range of needs, including training, informa-
tion exchange, and institutional infrastructure development;
(6) take measures to rapidly phase out production and subsequent
use of the "short list" of POPs as alternatives are made available for the
small number of remaining recognized uses; and
57. Attending NGOs included, among others, the World Wide Fund for Nature Inter-
national (formerly World Wildlife Fund), Greenpeace, Pesticide Action Network Asia
and the Pacific, Pesticide Action Network Philippines, and Pesticide Action Network
North America. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, Pesticide Action Network North
America, in San Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 4, 1996).
58. See Final Report, supra note 32, at 1, 2, 5.
59. Id. at 5-15.
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(7) develop a means of selecting replacements for POP pesticides
covering non-chemical as well as chemical alternatives and, wherever
applicable, reduce reliance on chemical pesticides.
The Final Report recommended that an alternative to a POP pesti-
cide should be considered inappropriate if, due to national or regional
conditions, it is likely to cause significant injury to workers, local com-
munities, or the environment.
60
D. International Activities, 1997
The IFCS presented its recommendations to UNEP's Governing
Council at its nineteenth session meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, which took
place from January 27 to February 7, 1997. The Governing Council
adopted all of the IFCS recommendations presented in the Final Report.
61
In February 1997, the ]FCS met in Ottawa, Canada to determine an
appropriate process to follow to develop the agreed upon international
convention regarding POPs.62 At this session, the ]FCS also discussed
the role NGOs should play in the process and whether any immediate
action should be taken to address the threat of POPs.
63
The next key step in developing an international POPs agreement
will be for UNEP to establish an Intergovernmental Negotiating Com-
mittee (INC) which will be given the task of drafting the agreement.
64
Because the INC will draft the agreement, membership in the INC is a
highly desirable position for the many interested parties, including gov-
ernment representatives, NGOs, and industry representatives. UNEP has
60. Id. at 10. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83 for discussion of the debate
surrounding chemical versus non-chemical alternatives; see also infra text accompanying
notes 127-45 for discussion of the development of criteria for substances to be scheduled
for a ban or phaseout under the proposed POPs convention.
61. Telephone Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, Pesticide Action Network North
America (Feb. 18, 1997); see Memorandum from Jack Weinberg, Greenpeace, to Marcia
Ishii-Eiteman, Pesticide Action Network North America I (Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with
author).
62. Memorandum from Jack Weinberg to Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 61, at 1;
Telephone Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 61.
63. Memorandum from Jack Weinberg to Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 61, at 2;
Telephone Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 61.
64. See Sound Management of Chemicals: International Efforts Gain Momentum,
UNEP NEWSL (United Nations Environment Programme), Feb.-Mar. 1997, at I [herein-
after "Sound Management"].
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determined that the INC will consist of both governmental and non-
governmental representatives. However, UNEP has labeled chemical in-
dustry interests and NGOs within the same so-called "non-governmental"
classification. Therefore, while there may be a balance of governmental
and non-governmental representation, there will not necessarily be a bal-
ance of environmental and chemical industry interests.
6 5
At the UNEP meeting in Nairobi in early 1997, the Governing
Council agreed that formal negotiation of the global POPs protocol
would begin in early 1998 with ratification scheduled for 2000.6 The
participants also agreed that "immediate action" should be taken based
on the Manila Final Report recommendations without waiting for the ul-
timately negotiated instrument.
67
E. Other Complementary Global Efforts to Limit POPs
In addition to the activity of UNEP and the IFCS, other ongoing
global efforts are currently attempting to reduce the risks associated with
POPs. One such program is the Global Programme of Action on the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities
("GPA"). 68 Adopted in 1995, the GPA advises that a compxrehensive se-
ries of measures should be adopted to reduce POPs-related emissions at
regional, national, and global levels around the world in order to protect
the marine environment and human health and to realize sustainable de-
velopment. 69 The GPA, like the IFCS, recognizes the need for a global
legally binding instrument on POPs.70
Another current global response to chemical safety problems is the
UNEP/FAO Prior Informed Consent ("PIC") procedure. The PIC proce-
dure, which was introduced in 1989, establishes protocols for trade in
certain banned or restricted chemicals and pesticides.71 Under the PIC
65. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 57.
66. Memorandum from Jack Weinberg to Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 61, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Global Programme of Action, supra note 1, at 1, 9, 37-40. The GPA was
adopted in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 3, 1995. Id. at 1.
69. Id. at 1, 7,9,37-41.
70. Final Report, supra note 32, at 2-3; Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 4.
71. See AGENDA 21, supra note 44, paras. 19.35-19.36, at 190; UNEP News Release
1996/51, New Environmental Controls Sought for Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides (Sept.
12, 1996). The PIC procedure involves many POP substances but is not specifically
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procedure, countries exporting pesticides which have been banned or re-
stricted in the country of origin must give notice of the hazardous nature
of the chemicals to the importing country. The importer can then decide
whether to approve or disapprove importation. The PIC procedure is
voluntary, and notification is required under PIC only when the chemical
is imported for the first time.73 However, efforts are currently being
made to develop PIC into a legally binding instrument.74 Several POPs
are on the list of PIC chemicals. 5
Rather than being incorporated together, the PIC procedure and the
upcoming POPs agreement will most likely remain as separate pieces in
the overall picture of global policy regarding chemicals.76 Negotiations
of the PIC regime will likely conclude in 1997, whereas the formal ne-
limited to POPs. Final Report, supra note 32, at 4; Response Strategies, supra note 44,
at 6; see also Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane, Pesticide Action Network Asia and
the Pacific, to David Hathaway, Pesticide Action Network North America 2 (Oct. 4,
1996) (on file with author).
72. UNEP News Release 1996151, supra note 71.
73. Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to David Hathaway, supra note 71, at 3.
The issue of export notification has been hotly debated; the importing developing coun-
tries favor notification upon each shipment, while exporting countries such as the United
States believe this practice would be unnecessary and useless. Id.
74. Elizabeth Dowdeswell, Executive Director, UNEP, Statement at the Second Ses-
sion of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for an International Legally Bind-
ing Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Sept. 16, 1996), UNEP
Speech 1996/22 (transcript available from author); see generally Consumers Interna-
tional et al., Action to Support an Improved Prior Informed Consent as an Early-Warning
System for Trade in Hazardous Chemicals (1997) (an NGO submission to the Third In-
ternational Negotiating Committee of the International Legally Binding Instrument for
the application of the PIC procedure, Geneva, Switzerland, May 26-30, 1997) (on file
with author); see also Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to David Hathaway, supra
note 71, at 3.
75. Final Report, supra note 32, at 4; Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 6; see
also Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to David Hathaway, supra note 71, at 2 (dis-
cussing the inclusion of POPs in the PIC process).
76. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, Pesticide Action Network North America,
in San Francisco, Cal. (July 29, 1997). Aside from the POPs convention, a broader goal
of the IFCS and environmental NGOs such as PAN is the negotiation of a general inter-
national framework convention on chemicals. ld.; see Sound Management, supra note
64, at 1; Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to Pesticide Action Network North
America, supra note 32, at 2-4 (discussing an agenda involving an "integrated mecha-
nism" regarding chemicals). The PIC regime and the POPs agreement are parts of this
overall plan. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra.
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gotiation of the POPs instrument is not scheduled to begin until 1998.
77
Therefore, environmental NGOs such as the Pesticide Action Network
view the PIC procedure as a separate process that would possibly be
slowed down if it were included in the POPs negotiations.73 In any case,
the information exchange fostered by the PIC procedure ultimately may
assist in the eventual control of POPs and their elimination from the
global environment.79
In addition to the GPA and the PIC procedure, the issue of POPs
was addressed in the LRTAP convention regarding air pollution. 80 Ad-
ministered by the ECE, this 1979 convention was the first legally binding
global instrument addressing air pollution issues.8' In 1994, LRTAP ini-
tiated discussion of a regional protocol for POPs.82 As stated previously,
LRTAP identified a short list of twelve POPs (the "dirty dozen"), which
was adopted by the IFCS for initial action, and LRTAP is currently de-
veloping criteria for additions to this list.8 3 LRTAP's process is directly
relevant to the efforts of the IFCS, but its work is not duplicative of the
IFCS because LRTAP does not include non-ECE members other than the
United States, Canada, and Japan.
77. Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to Pesticide Action Network North
America, supra note 32, at 2; Memorandum from Jack Weinberg to Marcia Ishii-
Eiteman, supra note 61, at 2.
78. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76.
79. For instance, in negotiating the POPs treaty, the PIC process may be used as a
reference to the toxicity of certain POPs and thus may act as part of the criteria for sub-
stances to be listed in the POPs treaty. Id.
80. The LRTAP Convention was signed by 33 governments and the ECE in 1979.
United Nations: Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning
the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983).
81. See Introductory Note to United Nations: Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Vola-
tile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 568,
568 (1991); JON MARTIN TROLLDALEN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 149-50 (1992).
82. POPs BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 1.
83. Id. See supra text accompanying note 54 for the short list of twelve POPs iden-
tified for initial action. For a description of LRTAP's recent activities, ,ee generally Ex-
ecutive Body for the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Ad Hoc
Preparatory Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Report on the Third Ses-




Other regional efforts to reduce the effects of POPs include the fol-
lowing: (1) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the North East Atlantic;84 (2) Barcelona Convention for the Protection of
the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution;85 (3) Esbjerg Declaration on the
Protection of the North Sea;86 (4) North American Commission for Envi-
84. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East At-
lantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069 (1993) [hereinafter "OSPAR Convention"]; see
Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 6. Annex I to this convention, regarding protec-
tion from land-based pollution, states that "it shall... be the duty of the Commission to
draw up... plans for the reduction and phasing out of substances that are toxic, persis-
tent and liable to bioaccumulate arising from land-based sources." OSPAR Convention,
supra, Annex I, art. 3(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1090. Signatories to the OSPAR Convention are
Belgium, Denmark, the European Communities, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. Id., 32 I.L.M. at 1069.
85. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution,
opened for signature Feb. 16, 1976, 1977 O.J. (L 240) 3, 15 I.L.M. 285 (1977) (entered
into force Feb. 12, 1978) [hereinafter "Barcelona Convention"]; see Final Report, supra
note 32, at 1; Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 6. This convention, ratified by 15
Mediterranean coastal states, provides for the adoption of additional protocols. Barce-
lona Convention, supra, arts. 15, 16, 1977 O.J. (L 240) 6. 15 I.L.M. at 294. The Proto-
col for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based
Sources was adopted on May 17, 1980, and entered into force on June 17, 1983. Proto-
col for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, 1983 O.J. (L 67) 3. It includes the following provisions relating to POPs: "The
Parties undertake to eliminate pollution of the Protocol area from land-based sources by
substances listed in Annex I to this Protocol." Id. art. 5(1), 1983 0.. (L 67) 4. "The
Parties shall strictly limit pollution from land-based sources in the Protocol area by sub-
stances or sources listed in Annex II to this Protocol." Id. art. 6(1), 1983 OJ. (L 67) 4.
Annex I includes substances selected not only on the basis of their toxicity, but based on
their persistence and bioaccumulation. Id. Annex I(A), 1983 O.J. (L 67) 7. These sub-
stances include organohalogen compounds, organophosphorus compounds, organotin
compounds, "persistent synthetic materials... which may interfere with any legitimate
use of the sea," and "substances having proven carcinogenic, teratogenic or mutagenic
properties in or through the marine environment." Id. Annex I(A)(1), (2), (3), (7), (8),
1983 O.J. (L 67) 7. Annex II includes "biocides and their derivatives not covered in An-
nex I." Id. Annex II(A)(2), 1983 O.J. (L 67) 8. Factors to be considered in authorizing
the discharge of wastes covered under the convention include the substances' persistence
(physical, chemical, or biological) in the marine environment; accumulation in biological
materials or sediments; and effects on human health through pollution impact on edible
marine organisms and bathing waters. Id. Annex III(B)(1), (3), Annex ll(E)(1){a), (b),
1983 O.J. (L 67) 9-10.
86. See Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 6.
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ronmental Cooperation; 87 and (5) Arctic Environmental Protection Strat-
egy (AEPS).88
The IFCS's Final Report acknowledges the need for "coordination
among different regional and international initiatives on POPs" to ensure
that programs developed to curb POPs do not conflict with one another
or lead to duplication of efforts.89
IV. Outstanding Issues
Although the international community appears to agree that an in-
ternational instrument is needed to phase out the production and use of
POPs, many practical issues must be resolved in order to formulate the
agreement. While environmental groups urge that immediate action be
taken on the wide range of POPs, business and chemical interests are
87. This commission is currently focusing on chemicals including DDT and chlor-
dane, both of which are POP pesticides. See Task Force on DDT and Chlordane, North
American Regional Action Plan on Chlordane (Oct. 10, 1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); Task Force on DDT and Chlordane, North American Regional Ac-
tion Plan on DDT (Oct. 10, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Addi-
tionally, a July 1996 report issued by the United States-Canada International Joint Com-
mission ("IJC") focusing on contamination of the Great Lakes region urges both
governments to target POPs for 'virtual elimination from production and commerce,'
calling for a "Binational Persistent Toxics Virtual Elimination Strategy." Environmen-
talists Hail New Reports Calling for Dioxin Phaseout, 24 PESTICIDE & Toxic CHEMICAL
NEWs, No. 37, July 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8852535. The IJC report, entitled
"Eighth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality," contains ten recommendations,
including the following: (1) zero discharge of persistent toxic chemicals; (2) develop-
ment of a bilateral process to adopt control programs to eliminate POPs. by certain dead-
lines; (3) recognizing that the food chain is one of the primary sources of exposure to
POPs, the use of common health standards in issuing sports fishing advisories throughout
the region; (4) use of the following principles to control pollution: "pracaution; preven-
tion; [and] targeting groups of chemicals rather than single ones using a weight of evi-
dence approach ...." Id.
88. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 (1991)
[hereinafter "AEPS"]; see Response Strategies, supra note 44, at 6. The AEPS is "a
strategy to coordinate national activities and policies among [Canada, Denmark. Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States] to strengthen envi-
ronmental protection efforts in the Arctic." Joint Communique and Declaration on the
Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382, 1383 (1996). The
AEPS includes language relating to identifying and reducing the risk! associated with
POPs ("persistent organic contaminants") and the need for multilateral action. AEPS,
supra, arts. 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 30 I.L.M. at 1644, 1650-51.
89. Final Report, supra note 32, at 14.
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likely to argue for a more deliberate approach that will allow them addi-
tional time to develop alternatives to POPs before they are banned.9
Such opposing interests may propose different timeframes for banning
the use, production, and distribution of POPs, as well as different meas-
ures to deal with existing stockpiles of POPs. Controversial issues
which must be addressed include: (1) allocating responsibility among
developed and developing countries; (2) establishing scientific criteria
for adding new chemicals to be covered by the POPs agreement; (3) es-
tablishing procedures to phase out byproducts such as dioxins and fu-
rans; (4) reconciling provisions of the POPs convention with regional
and national agreements and regulations; (5) combatting the growth of a
"black market" in banned chemicals; (6) alternatives to POPs (substitute
chemicals versus non-chemical practices and technologies); and (7) in-
formation exchange and standards for protection from the hazards of
POPs.
A. Allocating Shared Responsibility Among Developed and
Developing Countries
Participants at the IFCS meeting in Manila failed to reach a consen-
sus regarding the definition of the concept of "shared responsibilities"
among nations, industry, and international organizations.91 NGOs such
as Greenpeace maintain the position that less developed countries
("LDCs") alone should not bear the primary social and economic bur-
dens of phasing out POPs.92 This position is in line with certain basic
90. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83 (discussing the debate between chemi-
cal substitutes and non-chemical alternatives).
91. Final Report, supra note 32, at 8; Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 4, at 4.
92. POPs BAcKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 6. Greenpeace states that "[blalance
and equity requires [sic] the [POPs] instrument give equivalent attention to POPs-
generating technologies for which economic consequences currently fall mainly in highly
industrialized countries ...." Id. Greenpeace also stresses that attention must be paid
to the POPs-generating technologies in developed nations because
[t]hese technologies represent major global POPs sources which now are being
aggressively exported from the north to the south. It would be tragic to permit
continued pressure on southern countries to increase dependence on a new gen-
eration of POPs-polluting technologies at the same time they are being pressed
to end their dependence on an earlier generation of POPs-polluting technolo-
gies.
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principles initially codified in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which
held that the technical and financial needs of LDCs should tie considered
in making resources available to preserve and improve the environ-
ment.
93
It is well documented that certain powerful chemical conglomerates
regularly export substances which have been banned from use in many
industrialized countries to LDCs where regulations are much more lax. 
94
This practice has led to pesticide abuse in LDCs, causing: severe con-
tamination of the environment and food chain, as well as human suffer-
ing and death from poisoning. 95 Ironically, some LDCs are moving in
the dangerous direction of significantly increasing their demand for haz-
ardous POP substances. In countries such as Vietnam, for instance,
which is eager to boost agricultural exports because of inc:reased inter-
national demand, farmers embrace heavy pesticide use as the means to
realize short-term profits.96 On the other hand, the agrochemical indus-
try's powerful influence over international trade policy has come under
increasing criticism, particularly among Pacific Rim nations.97 In light
93. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, Principle 12, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1419 (1972) [hereinafter "Stockholm Declara-
tion"]. The Stockholm Declaration represented an initial effort at multilateral coopera-
tion to address protection of the environment. See, e.g., Michael J. Ke ly, Overcoming
Obstacles to the Effective Implementation of International Environmental Agreements, 9
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 447,450-51 (1997).
94. See, e.g., Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 5; PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, supra note
27, at 7-9; THE PESTICIDE TRAIL, supra note 29, at 24; Smith, supra note 31, at 3, 17
(noting the exports of banned pesticides from industrialized countries); see generally
ROBERT VAN DEN BOSCH, THE PESTICIDE CONSPIRACY (1978); CIRCLE o:F POISON, supra
note 27. See also Trade Restrictions on Poisonous Chemicals Eyed, JAPAN WKLY.
MONITOR, June 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5811715 (noting that several pesticides
banned in industrial countries are still used in large amounts in developing countries due
to lax controls).
95. PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 50.
96. Vietnam Agriculture: Farmers Forget Environment, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb.
19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7881698. For a discussion of the problems associated
with, and suggested approaches to handle, the recent dramatic agroexport expansion in
LDCs, see generally BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 27. See also supra notes 27-33
and accompanying text.
97. See NGOs Attempt to Demystify APEC, NEw STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 12294763. A representative of Pesticide Action Network Asia and
the Pacific is quoted as stating that five multinational corporations control 77% of the
world's food trade. Id. See also Paarlberg, supra note 8, at 311 (noting the lack of ac-
countability of international pesticide manufacturers for the harmful practice of aggres-
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of this situation, the following issues must be dealt with in the negotia-
tion of the POPs instrument(s).
1. Research & Development Assistance
Developing countries typically lack the internal resources to inde-
pendently eliminate sources of POPs and to manage and destroy stock
supplies and reservoirs.98 The FAO estimated in a June 1996 report that
more than 100,000 tons of pesticides are being stored in LDCs and urged
immediate action on the part of industrialized countries to assist with the
disposal of this lethal waste which poses grave threats to the environ-
ment and human health.99 LDCs continue to rely on DDT and other pes-
ticides to control insect-borne diseases and to increase their agricultural
yields.'oo In view of this heavy reliance, LDCs will need both financial
and technological assistanc in order to reduce and phase out such use.
10 1
The IFCS Final Report acknowledges that the special needs of LDCs will
have to be addressed in any legally binding instrument to phase out the
use of POPs. 1°2 Nevertheless, the specific terms by which the parties to
the POPs agreement will address this problem remain unresolved.
sively selling substances in developing countries that are banned in industrialized na-
tions).
98. See AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 19.55, at 193-94; BetterAlternatives, supra
note 6, at 14-18 (summarizing efforts to dispose of obsolete stocks of POPs in LDCs);
Final Report, supra note 32, at 12-13; PESTICIDE PROBLEMtS, supra note 27, at 7-15.
99. Pesticides Threaten Health in the Third IVorld, UN Says, OTrAWA CTIZEN, June
6, 1996, at A6, available in 1996 WL 3605880.
100. See Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 19-24 (discussing the high demand for
DDT to control mosquito-borne diseases and possible alternatives); PESTCIDE PROBLES,
supra note 27, at 49 (chronicling the use of DDT in Indonesia to control malaria); Paarl-
berg, supra note 8, at 309 (stating that use of pesticides in LDCs is often "a matter of life
or death"); PAN/CI Position Paper, supra note 32 (indicating the perceived importance
of DDT for disease control in LDCs); see also supra text accompanying note 96 (dis-
cussing heavy use of pesticides by farmers in LDCs); see generally BITTERSWEET
HARVESTS, supra note 27.
101. Many multilateral environmental agreements acknowledge the limited capabili-
ties of LDCs. See, e.g., AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 19.23, at 189; United Nations
Environment Progranune Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of
Basel Convention, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, Preamble, art. 10(3), art. 11(1),
28 I.L.M. 649, 657-59, 668 (1989) [hereinafter "Basel Convention"]. See infra notes
194-95 and accompanying text for discussion of the Montreal Protocol's (infra note 127)
provisions regarding LDCs.
102. Final Report, supra note 32, at 6-8, 14.
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2. Polluter Pays Principle
10 3
The purpose of the "polluter pays principle" is to integrate the so-
cial and environmental costs of a polluting substance into its production
processes. 1°4 Advocates of this principle believe it should be a funda-
mental element of the POPs instrument. These advocates assert that cor-
porations that have benefited financially from production and distribu-
tion of POPs should assist the transition away from the use of POPs
toward non-chemical alternatives and that these transnational corpora-
tions should finance the safe disposal of obsolete POPs.
t0 5
A POPs agreement advocating the "polluter pays principle" would
most likely be modeled on the funding structure of the Montreal Proto-
col. t°6 It should be noted that although under the Montreal Protocol an
explicit "polluter-pays" basis for contribution was advocated by several
103. The "polluter pays principle" ("PPP") has been incorporated into numerous in-
ternational environmental agreements. Often the PPP is interpreted as imposing the
"costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures" on the polluter. Bel-
gium-France-Netherlands: Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and
Scheldt, opened for signature Apr. 26, 1994, art. 3, para. 2(d), 34 IL.M. 851, 855
(1995); United Nations: Convention on the Protection and Use of Transltoundary Water-
courses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, part I, art. 2, para. 5(b), 31 I.L.M. 1312,
1315 (1992). However, more than one understanding of the PPP exists. For instance,
one European environmental treaty specifically focuses on strict liability and direct com-
pensation to victims of environmental damage. Council of Europe: Convention on Civil
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21,
1993, ch. I, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. 1228, 1230 (1993). Other agreements, however, follow the
approach delineated in the recommendation made by the OECD in 1989, which specifi-
cally rejects the concept of economic compensation to victims as part of the PPP and,
instead, includes costs of prevention measures. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development: Council Recommendation on the Applicalion of the Pol-
luter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, Appendix, paras. 3, 8, OECD Doe. (July 7,
1989), 28 I.L.M. 1320, 1322-23 (1989); see, e.g., agreements cited supro. Thus, one ap-
proach is retrospective and punitive while the other is prospective and preventative.
104. WWF POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 14. Some commentators see the PPP as
an efficient way for trading partners to address global environmental pollution that is
rooted in basic economic theory. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade
and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J.
INT'L L. 268, 295-98 (1997) (asserting that the PPP is an important vehicle in efforts to
reconcile trade issues with environmental concerns).
105. WWF Posrr1ON PAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
106. See id. at 16.
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LDCs, ultimately this provision was rejected. 0 7 Instead, the parties to
the Montreal Protocol established a Multilateral Fund made up of contri-
butions from developed countries and industry; under the terms of that
agreement, LDCs were to receive disbursements from the fund to de-
velop and purchase ozone-safe equipment and products
tC0
The parties to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment ("Rio Declaration") adopted the "polluter pays principle" with the
qualification that its application should not "distort" international trade
and investment.1°9 Agenda 21, the UNCED program of action on the en-
vironment produced at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, promotes the "pol-
luter pays principle" as an economic incentive to clean up the environ-
ment.110 Agenda 21 also advocates chemical industry responsibility for
life cycle analysis of hazardous chemicals, as well as the environmen-
tally safe disposal of such chemicals."'
t
While Agenda 21 promotes a policy of producer liability, scholars
have noted that the imposition of strict liability on chemical producers
will not deter every instance of global environmental damage."2 As in
107. See Jason M. Patlis, Note, The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol: A
Prototype for Financial Mechanisms in Protecting the Global Environment, 25 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 181, 209 & nn. 187-88 (1992).
108. Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, June 29, 1990, art. 10, paras. 2-10, 30
I.L.M. 537, 550-51 (1991) [hereinafter "London Revisions"]; see Patlis, supra note 107,
at 182. For discussion of the specific provisions of the Montreal Protocol regarding
funding, see generally FRANK BIEMANN, SAVING THE ATiOSPHERE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND AIR POLLTION 102-06 (1995); Patlis, supra note 107.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-202 for discussion of the Montreal Protocol as a
model for a POPs convention.
109. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, adopted June 14, 1992, Principle 16, 31 I.L.M. 874,
879 (1992) [hereinafter "Rio Declaration"]. Principle 16 states: "National authorities
should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in prin-
ciple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without dis-
torting international trade and investment." Id.
110. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, paras. 17.22(d), 19.49(a)-(b), at 150, 192.
111. Id. paras. 19.48, 19.49(a), 19.50(a)-(c), at 192-93.
112. Id. para. 19.49(a)-(b), at 192; Sanford E. Gaines, International Principles for
Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help
Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 313-16 (1989); Patlis, supra note 107, at
211-12.
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the case of ozone depletion, although estimates of the future costs of
banning POPs may be predicted, the health and environmental costs are
impossible to measure.' 13 Additionally, as is the case with czone deple-
tion, it is impossible to attribute environmental harms to one single
source due to the complex nature of POPs' harmful effects.1 4 Therefore,
strict liability cannot realistically be imposed as a means to fund the
phaseout of POPs.
In short, it appears that LDCs will require a certain measure of "as-
sistance funding" from developed countries and chemical producers in
order to be able to make their transition away from dependence on
POPs. 115 The extent to which chemical companies and developed nations
will fund these efforts remains to be seen.
3. Reporting Requirements and Exchange of Information
The proposed POPs agreement will likely include provisions dealing
with the exchange of information and reporting requiremems regarding
the production and use of POPs. The IFCS Final Report recommends
"comprehensive reporting and information exchange, within and between
countries and intergovernmental organizations" regarding scientific data,
sources and risks of POPs, and alternatives." 6 One scientific expert on
endocrine disrupters suggests that any proposed international instrument
should include provisions to improve health data systems in order to al-
low regional and international exchange of information." 7 In contrast to
the current PIC provisions which are voluntary, the information ex-
change provisions of the POPs convention should be mandatory among
the parties in order to effectively regulate the distribution of P OPs."
8
113. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 18; Patlis, supra note 107, at 212 & n.205.
114. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 18; Patlis, supra note 107, at 210 & n.195 (citing Ved
P. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A Preliminary In-
quiry, 30 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 375, 383-84 (1989)).
115. See Final Report, supra note 32, at 7-8; Patlis, supra note 107, at 181, 211-12.
116. Final Report, supra note 32, at 6-7.
117. COLBORN, supra note 2, at 222.




The timing and standards for phasing out POPs covered under the
proposed convention are likely to be the subjects of intense and pro-
longed negotiation. Such negotiations may be framed by the underlying
"precautionary principle," which holds that where threats exist "of seri-
ous or irreversible environmental damage, lack of scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation."' 19 The "precautionary principle" has been ap-
plied under international conventions regarding the environment as nec-
essary to prevent irreparable environmental damage. 20  The Rio
Declaration, produced at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, advocates a "pre-
cautionary approach" similar to this principle.12 1 The precautionary ap-
proach holds that pollution should be prevented before it occurs, rather
than managed after it has occurred.12 An example of this concept can be
seen in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which im-
poses strict measures for the prevention and reduction of pollution, in-
cluding that which is caused by POPs.' 3 Certain NGOs advocate such a
preventative approach for the proposed POPs agreement. 2 4 In any event,
the IFCS Experts group has determined that enough scientific evidence
exists "on the adverse human health and environmental impacts of POPs
to warrant coherent action at the national, regional and international
level." 1 The precautionary principle also underlies the debate regarding
119. WWF PosIoN PAPER, supra note 14, at 13. See generally THE PRECAUTOARY
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHAULENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 1-14, 27-28,
31-32 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996) for a comprehensive analysis of the pre-
cautionary principle and the history of its application.
120. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1982, art. 3, para. 3, 31 I.L.M. 849, 854
(1992); Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea: Ministerial
Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, art. XVI, para. 1, 27
I.L.M. 835, 840 (1988).
121. Rio Declaration, supra note 109, Principle 15, 31 I.L.M. at 879.
122. See AGENDA 21, supra note 44, paras. 17.5(d), 17.21, 19.49, at 148, 150, 192;
WWF POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
123. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Dec. 10,
1982, Part XII, arts. 194 -95, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1308 (1982).
124. WWF POSmON PAPER, supra note 14, at 14-15; PANICI Position Paper, supra
note 32.
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which criteria should be used for adding POPs to the list of the initial
twelve targeted POPs.
1 26
B. Criteria for Substances to Be Covered by the POPs Agreement
1. Formal Mechanisms for Adding to the List
The drafters of the POPs agreement will need to create flexible
mechanisms to accommodate not only the different types and uses of
POPs, but also to allow for future discoveries regarding additional harm-
ful POPs. 127 As noted previously, the current list of twelve POPs (the
"dirty dozen") consists of the following, many of which are already
banned or being phased out in developed countries: aldrin, dieldrin,
DDT, endrin, chlordane, heptachlor, hexachlorobenzene, mirex,
toxaphene, dioxins, furans, and PCBs.12 Other known POPs, such as
125. VANCOUVER MEETING STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 4. The expels agreed that
the action called for would include "bans, phase-outs and provisional sevore restrictions
for certain POPs." Id.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 132-45 (discussing the debate regarding po-
tential criteria for POPs to be covered by the agreement to ban them).
127. See Greenpeace International, Persistent Organic Pollutants: Timing, Scope and
Mandate of the International Negotiating Committee 6 (Jan. 1997) (advocating that the
proposed POPs instrument be applied not only to the "dirty dozen" but also to other
POPs "meriting inclusion in the future") (submitted by Greenpeace International to the
19th Session of the Governing Council of UNEP, Jan. 27-Feb. 7, 1997, Nairobi, Kenya)
(on file with author). Prior international environmental agreements have provided such
flexibility through the adoption of protocols and amendments addressing issues not cov-
ered in the original instrument. See, e.g., Basel Convention, supra note 101, arts. 17, 18,
28 I.L.M. at 673-74; Barcelona Convention, supra note 85, arts. 15, 16, 15 I.L.M. at 294.
See also Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541 (1987) [hereinafter "Montreal Protocol"]. The Montreal Protocol was later
amended. United Nations: Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer-Adjustments and Amendment, Nov. 23-24, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874 (1993) (entered
into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter "Copenhagen Amendments"]; London Revisions,
supra note 108, 30 I.L.M. 537.
128. Decision 18/32, supra note 48, at 1 n.60; POPs BACKGROUNDER, ,:upra note 48,
at 1; see supra text accompanying notes 28-30, 32-33 (indicating U.S. exports of POPs
banned for domestic use). Not until May 1997 did the production of chlordane and hep-
tachlor come to a halt in the United States. Up to that time, one U.S. company remained
the sole producer of these highly toxic POPs, which were banned from use within the
United States in 1987, exporting them to LDCs. Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 5;
Velsicol Ceases Production of Chlordane and Heptachlor, PESTICIDE ACIION NETWORK
N. AM. UPDATES SERV., May 23, 1997, at 1; Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 4, at 1. DDT is
produced in several countries including China and Mexico and continues to be exported
(Vol. 20:855
Reclaiming Our Future
endosulfan, for instance, have yet to make it to the specifically targeted
list under the proposed agreement, largely due to the fact that they con-
tinue to be used widely in developed countries such as the United
States. 29
As scientific research proceeds and new information regarding
POPs is discovered, the need will arise for new safeguards. In fact, the
IFCS Final Report recommends that an expert group be established by
the INC to develop a procedure for identifying additional POPs.1 ,
As the need arises to add new chemicals to the list of banned sub-
stances, a mechanism will be needed to add amendments and protocols to
the POPs agreement. Use of the amendment process in international
agreements is not new. The Montreal Protocol provides for such
amendments to the original agreement, requiring that the parties agree by
a two-thirds majority vote to any additions or amendments to the list of
substances.' 3 ' The same type of requirement could be applied to the
POPs instrument. Alternatively, the parties could establish an "expert
group" to determine periodically which POPs should be added to the list
covered by the convention. This group, consisting of representatives
from both developed and less developed countries, could issue an official
report periodically (e.g., every five years) reviewing the scientific evi-
dence and recommending any additions or changes to the list of banned
POPs.
2. Laboratory Data versus Actual Use Criteria
The issue remains as to the manner in which suspect chemicals will
be added to the "dirty dozen" list of banned POPs once the POPs agree-
ment is implemented. As stated previously, the IFCS concluded in June
1996 that an expert group should be established to develop science-based
criteria and procedures for identifying POPs in addition to the short list
by the United States to LDCs. Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 4, at 1. See supra note 32 for a
description and background of DDT.
129. See POPs SuMMARY, supra note 1, at 1; Pesticides, supra note 9, at 480. See also
STMIGRABER, supra note 9, at 161-67 (describing domestic regulation of pesticides, or the lack
thereof, in the United States). See Kelly, supra note 93, at 454-57, for a discussion of the dif-
fering perspectives of developed ("Northern") and developing ("Southern") states.
130. Final Report, supra note 32, at 6, 15.
131. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, art. 2, paras. 9-10, 26 I.L.M. at 1553-54.
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of twelve. 132 However, there was disagreement at the Manila conference
between the European representatives and those of LDCs as to the ap-
propriate scientific means for evaluating POPs. Although representa-
tives from many European countries (represented by LRTAP) advocate
the use of European laboratories to develop scientific criteria, many of
the LDC representatives, and those from regions not represented by
LRTAP, argue that "laboratory" data do not reflect expos-ure levels or
methods of chemical usage experienced in their locales, ai1d therefore,
laboratory data should not be used as the criteria for a global legally
binding instrument.1 33 LDCs and others argue that laboratory tests which
presume the field use of protective gear would be inaccurate since, as a
practical matter, users of agrochemicals in rural locales often fail to use
protective gear 134 and often cannot read warning labels, even where such
warnings are provided.
1 35
132. Final Report, supra note 32, at 6, 15. The Final Report states that "[t]he process
should incorporate criteria pertaining to persistence, bioaccumulation, toxicity and expo-
sure in different regions, and should take into account dispersion mechanisms for the at-
mosphere and the hydrosphere, migratory species and the need to reflect possible influ-
ences of marine transport and tropical climates." Id. at 6, 15.
133. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 57. Another related example of
geographically-based differences is suggested by authorities on environmental NGOs.
THOMAS PRINCEN & MATrHAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN WORLD POLITICS:
LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 7-8 (1994). The authors suggest thrt because envi-
ronmental NGOs based in the North (i.e., Europe) were rooted in the nclear disarma-
ment movement, their perspective and approaches are usually scientifically based. Id.
Many environmental NGOs from the South (developing countries such as the Philip-
pines), on the other hand, originated during periods of political upheaval resulting from
human rights challenges, social justice movements, or public health crises, Id.
134. See, e.g., PESTICIDE PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 40. Protective clothing and
other precautions, although considered essential to the use of pesticide., often are not
affordable or available in LDCs. Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 6-7, 10, 13; Paarl-
berg, supra note 8, at 311. A 1996 International Labor Organization (ILO) report indi-
cates that child workers in LDCs regularly mix, load, and apply highly toxic pesticides,
fertilizers, and herbicides. See From Prostitution, Manual Labor to Exposure to Toxic
Substances, BUsINESSWORLD (Manila), Dec. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14369860.
In the Philippines, agrochemical companies in combination with the government have
recently campaigned to educate farmers regarding safe and unsafe uses of pesticides.
CPAP Steps Up Drive Against Pesticide Misuse, BUSINESSWORLD (Manila), July 8, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11683126; Crop Protection Firms Vow to Continue Safe-Use
Drive, BUSiNEsSWORLD (Manila), Dec. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14371229.
While industry's expression of concern for human health effects is encouraging, the main
principle being promoted by the same trade association is the importance of agrochemi-
cals and biotechnology to develop new ones in ensuring adequate food supply for the
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Establishing criteria for POPs to be covered in the agreement is a
complex undertaking. t36 The debate regarding what criteria should be
employed when implementing the proposed POPs convention involves
two major factions.' 37 On one side, representatives of the agrochemical
growing world population. See Biotechnology Changing Crop Protection Approaches,
BusINEssWoaw (Manila), Sept. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11853301. These
profit-motivated agrochemical companies are not primarily inclined to phase out their
own products.
135. See, e.g., PESTICIDE PROBLMS, supra note 27, at 45; Paarlberg, supra note 8, at
311. Another result of pesticide use not usually addressed by the agrochemical industry
is the insects' developed immunity to pesticides, making them harder and even impossi-
ble to kill. See CARSON, supra note 7, at 251-52; New Harvests, supra note 27, at 6.
This can result in over-application of pesticides, which is extremely hazardous to hu-
mans. See Bernardo V. Lopez, Upshot: 'Killer Bug' Mafy Bring A National Crisis,
BusmEssWoRLD (Manila), Dec. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14371016. Further-
more, the use of POPs in tropical locales can cause detrimental health effects in Arctic
populations. PAN/Cl Position Paper, supra note 32; see COLBORN, supra note 2, at 107-
09 (noting high levels of POP contamination among Inuit people in Arctic Canada,
where no known POP sources exist); POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 2; Experts Call
for Global Action on Persistent Organic Pollutants, GLOBAL PESTICIDE CAMPAIGNER,
Sept. 1995, at 21; see also Global Programme of Action, supra note 1, at 38 (noting that
evidence indicates that POPs tend to migrate to "cooler latitudes").
136. One additional controversy concerns the issue of endocrine disruption. See su-
pra note 14 and text accompanying notes 14-24. Scientists and certain NGOs advocate
having endocrine disruption included under the definition of "toxicity" within the pro-
posed POPs convention. WWF POSITION PAPER, supra note 14, at 12. Endocrine dis-
ruption was not officially addressed at the Manila conference in June 1996. Interview
with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76. At the IFCS meeting in Ottawa, Canada in
February 1997, however, those attending specifically acknowledged that scientific evi-
dence shows that POPs cause endocrine disruption and agreed that activities to address
this issue should be coordinated. Sound Management, supra note 64, at 1; Memorandum
from Ronald Macfarlane to Pesticide Action Network North America, supra note 32, at
2-3. Thus, although endocrine disruption is not explicitly mentioned in the recommen-
dations of the Final Report from Manila, the increasing scientific evidence that endocrine
disruption is a health risk as serious as carcinogens may lead to its inclusion in the future
negotiations of the POPs agreement. But see supra and infra text accompanying notes
133-35, 137-45 (discussing the controversial debate regarding scientific criteria for POPs
to be covered by the convention).
137. Such a division between industry and environmentalists is not limited to the
POPs negotiations. See, e.g., Memorandum from Ronald Macfarlane to Pesticide Action
Network North America, supra note 32, at 3 (referring to the concern that the IFCS
might become a battleground between environmental NGOs and the chemical industry).
A similar debate regarding whose science is useful has occurred between developed
countries and LDCs regarding the UNCED Convention on Biological Diversity, which
concerns maintenance of biodiversity, biotechnology interests, intellectual property
rights, and indigenous people's rights. United Nations Conference on Environment and
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industry advocate the use of data from scientific laboratory testing.
1 38
Often chemical companies invoke science and the lack of incriminating
data as a basis for their production of POPs. 39 On the other hand, LDCs
and environmental NGOs support the use of health data based on actual
use (e.g., on farms); these groups fear that if the lab data prevails as the
standard, the result will be endless scientific studies without any prog-
ress toward the actual phaseout of harmful POPs. t4° Advocates for this
position invoke the "precautionary principle," which, as explained
above, holds that where threats exist of "serious or irreversible environ-
mental damage, lack of certainty should not be used as a reason for post-
poning measures to prevent environmental degradation."' 41 Utilizing this
principle in the POPs agreement would favor imposing strict: measures to
reduce and prevent altogether the use of POPs, notwithstanding the fact
Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 822 (1992); see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropria-
tion of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities,
17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 928 (1996); see generally Klaus Bosselmann, Plants and Poli-
tics: The International Legal Regime Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. LAW & POL'Y 111 (1996). See David A. Wirth, The Role of Sci-
ence in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817,
837 (1994) for an analysis of what constitutes "sound science" for purposes of negotiat-
ing an international treaty affecting trade and the environment. For a discussion of sci-
entific uncertainty and lack of data in the context of national regulation and international
trade agreements see id. at 837-41. See also Kelly, supra note 93, at 480-81 (discussing
the role of scientific uncertainty in the negotiation and implementation of international
environmental agreements).
138. This faction's support of laboratory data does not refer specifically to LRTAP's
criteria in particular, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 133-35. The chemical
industry is represented at IFCS meetings by organizations such as the Groupement Inter-
national des Associations Nationales de Fabricants de Produits Agrochimiques (GIFAP),
an international group of trade associations of agrochemical manufacturers with members
in over forty countries, including the United States. Interview with Marcia Ishii-
Eiteman, supra note 76; see WHAT Is GIFAP, ANNEXE AU BULLETN GIFAP I Jan.-Feb.
1987.
139. An example of the chemical industry's attitude regarding the use of POPs was
provided by the President and CEO of Velsicol when his company announced that it
would stop production of chlordane and heptachlor: 'We have always believed in the ef-
ficacy of these products, and the science that supports their continued ue, but the eco-
nomics no longer support continued manufacture.' Velsicol Ceases Production of
Chlordane and Heptachlor, supra note 128, at 1.
140. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76.
141. WWF PosMON PAPER, supra note 14, at 13. See supra text accompanying notes
119-26 (discussing the "precautionary principle").
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that "perfect" proof of direct harm is not available to an absolute cer-
tainty. In any case, the scientific basis for action to phase out POPs con-
tinues to be strengthened as evidence increases of the harmful effects of
POPs on human health and the environment. "[N]ew discoveries [re-
garding human exposure to hormone-disrupting chemicals] have only
heightened concern."' 42
Finally, those who favor phasing out POPs argue that the agro-
chemical industry introduces new synthetic chemicals into world markets
without adequately testing them for potential harmful effects.143 As Ra-
chel Carson noted in 1962, "we have allowed these chemicals [insecti-
cides] to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on
soil, water, wildlife, and man himself. Future generations are unlikely to
condone our lack of prudent concern for the integrity of the natural
world that supports all life."' 44 Indeed, the lack of data regarding the
risks posed by POPs, particularly endocrine disruption, is mainly due to
the lack of funding for research in this complex area.
1 45
C. Special Strategies for Dioxins and Furans
Dioxins and furans are industrial byproducts, as distinguished from
other POPs that are intentionally dispersed into the environment, such as
pesticides.146 These chemical contaminants are created during manufac-
turing processes - for example, during the creation of preservatives or
pesticides, the bleaching of paper with chlorine, and the burning of fossil
fuels.147 Dioxins and furans are often found together, and like other
POPs, they appear everywhere - in soil, water, air, and food - and accu-
mulate in fat tissue.148 Dioxin is particularly infamous as the highly
toxic chemical linked to the Agent Orange controversy which stemmed
from the heavy use of herbicides during the Vietnam War.149 Dioxin has
142. COLBoRN, supra note 2, at 139.
143. Id. at 138-39.
144. CARSON, supra note 7, at 13.
145. Id. at 152 (asserting that unexplored questions regarding chemical pesticides
"urgently require the precise answers that only extensive research can provide, yet funds
for such purposes are pitifully small."); CoLBORN, supra note 2, at 207.
146. Final Report, supra note 32, at 11-12; COLBORN, supra note 2, at 113.
147. CoLBoRN, supra note 2, at 113.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 113-14.
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been proven to cause several forms of cancer.150 Other harmful effects of
dioxin include immune system suppression and reproductive system
damage.' 5 1 Like DES, very low doses of dioxin may cause long-term
damage to those who are exposed while in the womb or through their
mother's milk'
5 2
An international agreement has not yet been reached regarding the
reduction or elimination of dioxins and furans.15 3 The IFCS Final Re-
port, while acknowledging the harmful effects of dioxins and furans,
does not directly state that these POP byproducts should be eliminated.
Furthermore, as eliminating dioxins and furans may require the use of
advanced, innovative technology, it will likely be very expensive to
achieve. The question of who will fund the recuired technology and
make it available to LDCs remains undetermined. 5
Certain environmental NGOs advocate inserting provisions into the
POPs agreement to require the elimination of toxic manufacturing by-
products such as dioxins and furans. 56 These NGOs contend that proto-
cols should be established for the special treatment of dioxmtns and furans
because of the differences in their production and use from the other
POPs. 5 7 Nevertheless, the difficulty of accomplishing the total elimina-
tion of these industrial byproducts is widely recognized. First, so far,
neither scientific technology nor NGOs have come up with appropriate
alternative practices for the incineration of chlorinated compounds.' 1
Second, the elimination of dioxin is further complicated by the fact that
150. Id.
151. Id. at 116.
152. Id. at 112-20.
153. See Final Report, supra note 32, at 11.
154. See A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, Intergovernmental Forim on Chemical
Safety, at 14-15, 17, IFCS/WG.POPs.8 (June 7, 1996) (prepared by WWF, presented at
the IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group On POPs meeting, June 21-22, 1996, Manila, Philip-
pines) (on file with author).
155. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76.
156. A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 14-15; POPs
BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 4; WWF PosITIoN PAPER, supra note 14, at 11; Ishii-
Eiteman, supra note 4, at 4.
157. WWF PosITIoN PAPER, supra note 14, at 11.
158. See, e.g., U.S. EPA Draft Dioxin Reassessment Released, GLOBAL PESTICIDE




the main economic burden of such elimination would fall on developed
countries rather than on LDCs. 159
Developed countries are less likely to object to eliminating produc-
tion of those POPs which have already been banned by their govern-
ments, as this would not impede their industries' ability to continue do-
ing business as usual.16° Eliminating dioxins and furans, on the other
hand, is likely to be more controversial due to the potential costs of
elimination and the fact that developed nations themselves would bear
that cost. 61 As a result, it may be difficult to convince industry that the
elimination of dioxins and furans is essential to the proposed POPs
agreement.
D. Regional & National Measures to Control POPs
The IFCS Final Report indicates that national and regional measures
should be incorporated and recognizes the "need to find, at the national
level, the most effective and appropriate mix of policy instruments and
measures to implement agreed international commitments." 16  Most in-
ternational environmental agreements acknowledge that regional and na-
tional control measures are necessary to effective implementation of the
stated goals. 63 In the case of POPs, local regulation will be essential in
159. See A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 14-15; POPs
BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 4; WWF PosmoN PAPER, supra note 14, at 4.
160. See POPs BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 4.
161. See id., which states:
Action to eliminate sources of dioxin directly threatens the perceived long-term
interests of transnational chemical companies. Also, the main economic bur-
dens associated with elimination of dioxin sources rests in powerful countries
like the United States, Europe and Japan. This contrasts with other POPs where
the main economic or social burden for source elimination falls on developing
countries and countries with economies in transition.
162. Final Report, supra note 32, at 14; see also id. at 6-7.
163. See, e.g., AGENDA 21, supra note 44, paras. 19.39(a), 19.42, 19.52, 19.54, 19.69-
19.74, at 191, 193, 196; Basel Convention, supra note 101, arts. 3, 11, 14, 28 I.L.M. at
661, 668, 670; Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, art. 9, 26 I.L.M. at 1556. The Basel
Convention, for example, provides for national definitions of hazardous wastes by each
party to the convention, in addition to those listed in annexes to the convention, that
should fall within the scope of the convention. Basel Convention, supra note 101, art.
3(1), 28 I.L.M. at 661. Furthermore, Article 11 of the Basel Convention provides that
parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral, or regional agreements apart from the con-
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order to control the use, production, transportation, and disposal of the
substances covered by the proposed agreement. Because different gov-
ernments are likely to enact different regulations, it will be necessary to
coordinate these measures among various governmental and non-
governmental agencies in order to ensure compliance with the POPs
agreement's provisions.
164
E. Potential Conflict Between Trade Interests and the POPs
Agreement
Additional coordination will be needed to ensure that trade agree-
ments and sovereignty issues will not interfere with or circumvent the
provisions of the POPs agreement. 65 History demonstrates that conflicts
invariably arise between trade/development interests and environmen-
talism. 6  Nonetheless, the two concepts do not necessarily conflict on
vention so long as the provisions are no less "environmentally sound" than those of the
convention. Id. art. 11(1), 28 I.L.M. at 668.
164. See Final Report, supra note 32, at 6-8. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Im-
plementation, Enforcement, and Compliance with International Environmental Agree.
ments-Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 37 (1996) for discussion of potential barriers to effective global envi-
ronmental treaties and the importance of coordination among and within states. See also
Kelly, supra note 93, at 461 (asserting that, to date, UNEP has failed to coordinate global
and regional environmental efforts).
165. See generally DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL
PROTOCOL (1996) (analyzing the conflicts between trade liberalization and multilateral
agreements on environmental protection and the relationship between the Montreal Pro-
tocol's trade provisions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 'rade ("GAIT'));
Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTOIGATT System, 24 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 433 (1995) (discussing the potential for the World Trade Organization
("WTO")IGATT system to override environmental agreements); Schoenbaum, supra note
104 (discussing the issues involved in reconciling free trade interests and the GATT with
agendas in favor of environmental protection); see also generally Kelly, supra note 93, at
471-80 (describing the fundamental differences between capitalism and environmental-
ism as obstacles to the implementation of international environmental agreements).
166. See generally, e.g., Kelly, supra note 93; Schoenbaum, supra note 104. This
Note does not attempt to reconcile the interaction between international trade law and
environmental law and policy. It should be noted, however, that this issue will need to
be addressed by the creators of an international POPs agreement. S e also generally
DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GAIT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE (1994)
for a comprehensive analysis of trade issues confronting environmental movements. The
drafters of the POPs convention will also need to address the question of how to deal
with non-parties when their actions interfere with the purposes of the treaty. See, e.g.,
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all issues. 167 Thus, it is feasible to impose a domestic ban on a chemical
product such as a POP which still complies with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the World Trade Organization's
("WTO") rules.'6 If international agreement can be reached concerning
the overall goal of protecting the earth's ecosystems and environment,
trade agreements may be coordinated so as not to interfere with this goal.
F. Potential Emergence of a Black Market
Historically, any movement to ban material goods from world mar-
kets inadvertently results in the creation of a "black market" in the
banned substances. For example, chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"), chemi-
cal compounds covered by the Montreal Protocol, have become a "most
lucrative contraband for smugglers," producing "a growing black mar-
ket." '169 Additionally, in the Philippines, banned pesticides are being
successfully smuggled into the market.17 0 The continued high demand
Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, art. 4, 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55 (providing for control of
trade with non-parties).
167. See Schoenbaum, supra note 104, at 268-69 & nn.5-7 (providing additional key
sources for a comprehensive view of the arguments framing the debate between propo-
nents of free trade and environmentalists); Shihata, supra note 164, at 41-42.
168. Article XX(b) of the GATT provides that bans on exports or imports are permis-
sible where "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
188, 262. For discussion of possible interpretations of this language in the context of
multilateral environmental agreements, see Schoenbaum, supra note 104, at 273-74, 276-
77; Wirth, supra note 137, at 820-22. As a result of the Uruguay Round of trade nego-
tiations, the WTO was established on January 1, 1995. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Trade Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125,
1143-45 (1994). See Schoenbaum, supra note 104, at 301-02 for a discussion of the vi-
ability of the PIC regime (see supra text accompanying notes 71-79) under WTO rules.
169. CFC Smuggling Growing, Says DOJ, RECORDER (San Francisco), Jan. 10, 1997,
at 6. The demand for CFCs for car air conditioners and the high cost of legal chemical
substitutes has led to illegal trafficking of enormous proportions and the call for in-
creased prosecution. Hilary F. French, Learning from the Ozone Experience, in STATE
OF Tun WORLD 1997: A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PRoaRnss TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE SOcIETY 151, 167-68 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1997).
170. See, e.g., Government Helpless Against Illegal Pesticide Influx, BUSMOESsWOD
(Manila), May 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11690607; Gov't Urged to Monitor Dis-
tribution of Pesticides, BusINEssWoRtO (Manila), May 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11690564; Local Government Units Deputized to Help in Safe Use of Pesticides,
BUsunESSWORiD (Manila), Jan. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL7198146.
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for the banned substances makes them prime candidates for "unscrupu-
lous traders. 17' Thus, there is concern that the implementation of a
POPs agreement will result in a similar black market trade in those
chemicals banned by the agreement.
One means of deterring such a black market would be to include
specific punitive measures in the POPs agreement. The 1992 Rio Earth
Summit noted in Agenda 21 that no current global international agree-
ment covers illegal international traffic in banned chemicals.172 Agenda
21 specifically acknowledged that such black markets are harmful to
human health and the environment.173 Therefore, Agenda 21 recognized
the prevention of such illegal traffic in banned chemicals as a worthy
objective and suggested that concluding an international instrument to
enforce restrictions on chemicals would aid in fulfilling this objective.
174
The Basel Convention's provisions regarding illegal traffic in hazardous
wastes may act as a model for the drafters of the POPs agreement.
175
However, it is likely that more expansive and specific punitive measures
will be required to deter potential traffickers of the banned POPs.
One method to discourage a black market in POPs would be to im-
pose specific criminal penalties in the POPs treaty for deliberate viola-
tions 76 Additionally, strict trade sanctions could be imposed on partici-
pating nations that fail to meet the obligations of the treaty.
171. Gov't Urged to Monitor Distribution of Pesticides, supra note 170; see also
Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 5.
172. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 19.66, at 195. See also Patlis, supra note 107,
at 211 (stating that there is no international mechanism to enforce the mandate for states
to regulate activities within their jurisdictions in order to prevent pollu*ion across bor-
ders).
173. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 19.66, at 195.
174. Id. paras. 19.39(d), 19.66, 19.67, at 191, 195. Agenda 21 also recognized that
cooperative efforts among national governments would be necessary to prevent interna-
tional traffic. Id. paras. 19.69-19.74, at 196.
175. Basel Convention, supra note 101, art. 9, 28 IL.M. at 666-67. The convention
provides that the parties shall cooperate to ensure that the substances in cuestion are dis-
posed of as soon as possible in an environmentally sound manner. id. art. 9(4), 28
I.L.M. at 667. Further, the convention provides that each party "shall introduce appro-
priate national/domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic." Id. art. 9(5), 28
I.L.M. at 667.
176. Another means of deterring illegal trafficking of POPs will be to introduce and
make available practical, affordable alternatives. See supra note 169; see also infra text
accompanying notes 177-83 (discussing the debate regarding POPs alternatives).
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Furthermore, specific enforcement measures should be included in the
POPs agreement to ensure that the signatories abide by the agreement's
terms. For example, close monitoring of labeling of POPs being im-
ported or exported should be required. Finally, the agreement should
specify a judicial forum to address violations and settle disputes among
member states.
F. Chemical versus Non-ChemicalAlternatives to POPs
The chemical industry has an interest in promoting the use of
chemicals rather than non-chemical practices as alternatives to the POPs
being phased out under the agreement.177 On the other hand, environ-
mental NGOs prefer non-chemical alternatives to chemical substitutes
because of the danger that the substituted chemicals may be as harmful
as the chemicals they replace.
Two examples of non-chemical agricultural alternatives are (1)
sustainable agriculture and (2) integrated pest management. "Sustain-
able agriculture" involves minimizing environmental impact with low
chemical inputs while maintaining farm profitability. 7 NGOs work
with farmers around the world to promote and develop sustainable meth-
ods that will meet current consumption needs without destroying re-
sources needed for the future.179 The FAQ has advocated "integrated
177. Environmental NGOs, on the other hand, advocate the use of "not in kind alter-
natives" (i.e., changing the types of processes that involve and produce POPs) in order to
eliminate POPs. See, e.g., A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 10 (de-
fining "not in kind alternatives" for CFCs). Cf. supra text accompanying notes 154-61
(regarding the impracticability of eliminating sources of dioxins and furans).
178. No absolute definition of sustainable agriculture exists. JULES N. PRE=TY Er AL.,
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IMPACTS ON FOOD PRODUCTION AND CHALLENGES FOR FOOD
SECURrrY 6 (1996); WoRLD RESoURCES INSTITUTE, AGRICULTURAL PoLIcY AND
SUSTAINABILITY: CASE STUDIES FROM INDIA, CHILE, THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED
STATES 1-2 (Paul Faeth ed., 1993) [hereinafter "SUSTAINABILrY"]; WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE, NEw PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 8 (Lori Ann Thrupp ed.,
1996) [hereinafter "NEW PARTNERHIS"].
179. See generally PRETTY, supra note 178; NEW PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 178;
SUSTAINABILrrY, supra note 178 (providing case studies in several countries). For exam-
ple, one organization in the Philippines, Integrated Community Development Assistance
Incorporated, organizes and promotes sustainable agriculture through ecological pest
management and non-chemical fertilizing techniques, as well as by utilizing multicrop-
ping instead of monocropping. See Prime P. Sarmiento, Food Basin in the Makin', Bus.
DAILY, Dec. 4, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14104114.
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pest management" ("IPM") in Southeast Asia for more than five years. 80
IPM uses a combination of biological, environmental, genetic, and
chemical control methods such as crop rotation and mixture of crops;
management of habitat to reduce pests; selection and development of
plants with resistance to specific pests and diseases; and measures to im-
prove soil fertility. Under IPM, chemicals are used only as a last re-
sort.18 2 The benefits of IPM include increased crop yield (dispelling the
myth that chemicals are necessary in order to feed the world), reduction
in total production costs, reduced health risks to farmers and consumers,
reduced risk of major pest outbreaks, and preservation of b .odiversity in
the environment.
183
180. ASEAN Aggie Ministers Pushing for Reduced Use of Farm Pesticides,
BUSiNEsSWORLD (Manila), Aug. 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11852698. Agenda 21
from the 1992 UNCED Rio Earth Summit suggests IPM as one alternative to the use of
toxic pesticides in agriculture. AGENDA 21, supra note 44, para. 19.45, at 192. Addi-
tionally, the Asian Development Bank recently endorsed an environmc:nt-friendly pest
management program by approving a loan for its introduction in Indonesia. See ADB
Approves 44 Million Dollar Loan for Indonesia, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 26,
1996, available in 1996 WL 12146005. Only recently did IPM receive official support
from nations in Southeast Asia. See ASEAN Aggie Ministers Pushing for Reduced Use of
Farm Pesticides, supra. In the Philippines, for example, IPM has been "successfully"
implemented as the country's response to the Agenda 21 mandate for .ustainable agri-
culture. DA's IPM Program Reports Gains, BUINESSWORLD (Manila), Nov. 18, 1996,
available in 1996 WI., 11857013; Pesticide Producers Endorse Use of Integrated Pest
Management, BUSnmsSWORLD (Manila), Oct. 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL
11856010. IPM is a practice introduced as one of the steps toward truly ;ustainable agri-
culture.
181. Pesticide Producers Endorse Use of Integrated Pest Management, supra note
180. See generally C.A.B. INTERNATIONAL & ASiAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, INTEGRATED
PEST MANAGEMENT IN THE AsIA-PACiFC REGION (1992) for a regional overview of IPM.
182. Pesticide Firms Recycle Bottles, BUSINESSWORLD (Manila), Jan, 2, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 7197517; Pesticide Producers Endorse Use of Integrated Pest Man-
agement, supra note 180.
183. Department of Agriculture Program to Train Farmers in New Technology,
BUSINEssWORLD (Manila), Sept. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11853674.
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V. Comparison of the Current POPs Proposal to the Montreal
Protocol
A. Similarities
Many parallels can be drawn between the situation addressed by the
1987 Montreal Protocol'84 (namely, the depletion of the ozone layer by
emissions of CFCs, halons, and other ozone depleting substances) and
the current issues faced by those attempting to curtail the harmful effects
of POPs. The problems presented by both POPs and ozone depleting
substances are global in cause and impact. 8 5 Many nations have agreed
that concerted international action is required to protect human health
and the environment against the adverse effects of POPs and ozone de-
pleting substances ("ODS"). 186 These countries also agree that interna-
tional measures are necessary to control the production and dissemina-
tion of POPs and ODS and that controlling these substances and products
containing them has a significant effect on international trade and the
184. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. 1541. The Montreal Protocol was
negotiated as a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
Id.; United Nations: Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. The Vienna Conven-
tion, as the starting point for international action to curtail the depletion of the ozone
layer, articulates the general obligations of the parties. Vienna Convention, supra, 26
I.L.M. 1516. The Montreal Protocol, which has been amended several times, provides
specifics regarding the timing, methods of compliance, and substances to be controlled.
Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. 1541; see generally A Montreal Protocol
for POPs?, supra note 154; Some Relevant Aspects of the Montreal Protocol, Intergov-
ernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, IFCS/WG.POPs.2 (June 7, 1996) (paper prepared
by UNEP, presented at the IFCS meeting in Manila, Philippines, June 21-22, 1996) (on
file with author) [hereinafter "Relevant Aspects"]. Much literature exists regarding the
depletion of the ozone layer and the Montreal Protocol and its implications. See, e.g.,
RIcHARD ELuOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMAcY: NEw DIREcTIONs IN SAFEGUARDING THE
PLANET (1991); BERMANN, supra note 108, at 21-42, 102-06; JACK FISItAN & ROBERT
KALISH, GLOBAL ALERT: THE OZONE POLLuTioN CRISIS (1990) [hereinafter "GLOBAL
ALERT"]; AluUN MAKHuANI & KEvIN R. GURNEY, MENDING THE OZONE HOLE: SciecE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY (1995) [hereinafter "MENDING THE OzoNE HOl.']; Edward A.
Parson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH 27-73 (Peter M.
Haas et al. eds., 1993).
185. Relevant Aspects, supra note 184, at 1.
186. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. at 1550-51; Final Report, supra
note 32, at 6, 14. Additionally, control measures can be applied to production and con-
sumption of either ODS or POPs.
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economies of all nations. 187 Additionally, parties to the Montreal Proto-
col and those attending the POPs negotiations acknowledge the need for
special provisions in order for less developed countries to meet their ob-
ligations under the instrument.1 88
Finally, POPs and ODS are similar in that regardless of the particu-
lar source of an individual POP or ODS, its long-term adverse effects are
spread throughout the environment. Substances that deplete the ozone
layer eventually reach the stratosphere.1 89 Similarly, POPs do not break
down, but rather travel across land and oceans and ultimately accumulate
in living organisms and their offspring.19° In short, use of POPs on one
continent may affect the environment of another continent.191 Because
both ODS and POPs have global effects, the solution to their curtailment
must be global as well.
B. The Montreal Protocol as a Prototype for a POPs Agreement
The Montreal Protocol set a precedent as a concerted international
initiative to confront a global environmental crisis; therefore, it may
serve as a model for the POPs agreement. 192 It has been suggested that
187. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. at 1550-51; Final Report, supra
note 32, at 1-2, 6, 14; see also Relevant Aspects, supra note 184, at 4-5; POPs
BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 4.
188. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, arts. 5, 9, 10, 26 I.L.M. at 1551, 1555-57;
Final Report, supra note 32, at 6-8, 14.
189. GLOBAL ALERT, supra note 184, at 44-45; J.G. Anderson et al., Free Radicals
Within the Antarctic Vortex: The Role of CFCs in Antarctic Ozone Loss, 251 SCIENCE 39,
45 (1991).
190. Global Programme of Action, supra note 1, at 37-38; COLBORN, sufpra note 2, at
105; POPs BACKGROUNDER, supra note 48, at 3; POPs SUMMARY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
191. See supra note 135 (regarding POPs' effects in the Arctic).
192. See, e.g., CoLIoRN, supra note 2, at 218-19; French, supra note 169, at 151-53;
Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Conca, The Implications of Global Ecological Interdepend-
ence, in THE STATE AND SOCIAL POWER IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 327, 334
(Lipschutz & Conca eds. 1993); Pamela Wexler, Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Be-
yond the Montreal Protocol, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1989); David Hurlbut, Note,
Beyond the Montreal Protocol: Impact on Nonparty States and Lessons for Future Envi-
ronmental Protection Regimes, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 344, 344-45 (1993);
Patlis, supra note 107, at 193. For a discussion of the development of the Montreal
Protocol, see French, supra note 169, at 151-71. See also generally BIERMANN, supra
note 184, at 26-42; MENDING THE OZONE HOLE, supra note 184, at 224-27; Patlis, supra
note 107, for discussion of the Montreal Protocol's control measures and amendments
thereto. A thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol is beyond
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like the Montreal Protocol, the proposed instrument to curtail POPs
should identify principles with the understanding that protocols will be
developed to deal with specific targeted substances within agreed upon
timetables.1 93 Additionally, the POPs convention should include, as does
the Montreal Protocol, special flexible provisions for LDCs, including a
reasonable timeframe for LDCs to adjust their practices. 9' 4 Finally, cer-
tain funding measures of the Montreal Protocol demonstrate a method by
which liability is imposed generally on developed nations without mak-
ing any one nation or group liable per se.1
95
the scope of this Note. A portion of this Note, rather, attempts to discuss some aspects of
the Montreal Protocol relevant to the process of developing an international legally
binding instrument regarding POPs.
193. A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 3.
194. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, art. 5, 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56; Final Re-
port, supra note 32, at 6-8, 14. There is an inevitable tension between LDCs and indus-
trialized countries in the negotiation of an environmental treaty. See, e.g., Lipschutz &
Conca, supra note 192, at 334; Wexler, supra note 192, at 15-17; Hurlbut, supra note
192, at 344. While the Montreal Protocol may be lauded for its recognition of the special
needs of LDCs, its provisions, particularly with regard to the implementation of financial
mechanisms, have been criticized for the actual results. See generally STEVE
KRErZMANN, MoNEY To BuRN: THE WoRLD BANK, CHEMIcAL COMPANIES AND OZONE
DEPLETION (Greenpeace 1994); Patlis, supra note 107. A thorough discussion of the
structure of the financial mechanisms provided for under the Montreal Protocol is be-
yond the scope of this Note. However, it should be noted that one of the most significant
criticisms of the Multilateral Fund established under the Montreal Protocol is that its
administration has been co-opted by the chemical industry. Indicative of this claim is the
fact that a disproportionate amount of funds have gone toward the production and use of
alternative chemicals, rather than non-chemical alternative practices. See A Montreal
Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 10. See also supra and infra text accompanying
notes 177-83, 196-99 (discussing the debate between redesigned processes and chemical
substitutes).
195. Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. 1541. Under the terms of the
Montreal Protocol, monies are redistributed from countries that have benefited from the
production of the environmentally hazardous substances being phased out to LDCs that
have not benefited. Patlis, supra note 107, at 211-12. Liability is not directly imposed
with a mandate of compensation for past harm. Rather, the Protocol seeks to deter future
harm through an assistance scheme. ld. at 209, 212-13. One observer notes that the dis-
tinction between compensation and assistance is only one of semantics. Id. However,
such a distinction plays a significant practical role in international relations by mitigating
the potential antagonism between states that would be caused by cooperation based on
the threat of liability as opposed to cooperation based on the common interest in pro-
tecting the global ecosystem. Id. The latter form of cooperation is essential to the
forming of an international legally binding agreement. Id. at 212-13.
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On the other hand, the Montreal Protocol does not provide a useful
model for dealing with the controversy regarding the use of non-
chemical versus chemical substitutes for POPs. Under the Montreal
Protocol, the ODS-producing industry has been able to co-opt the fund-
ing mechanism in order to replace the banned substances with substitute
chemicals.1 96 In the case of POPs negotiations, the chemical industry
would like to follow this model by replacing banned POPs with chemical
substitutes so that they can continue to profit from their production of
such chemicals.' 97 However, many scientists and policy makers argue
that the proposed POPs convention should encourage non-chemical al-
ternatives to those practices currently being employed.1 98 These partici-
pants argue that if chemical substitutes are accepted as a means of phas-
ing out targeted POPs, the whole purpose of the POPs agreement could
be frustrated and a new hazard created by merely substituting one envi-
ronmental threat with another.199
196. In the case of ODS, the chemical industry was able to create a market for its new
products through use of the funding provided for under the Montreal Protocol. A Mont-
real Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 14.
197. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76.
198. A Montreal Protocol for POPs?, supra note 154, at 13-14; COLBORN, supra note
2, at 225-30; see also supra text accompanying notes 177-83 (discussing the debate re-
garding alternatives to POPs). As noted above, the Montreal Protocol males significant
allowances for substitute chemical substances to promote the phaseout of ODS. See su-
pra note 196; see also infra note 199. Because industry cooperation was e:;sential to the
success of the Montreal Protocol, such allowances are not surprising. In the case of
POPs, however, the impetus behind non-chemical substitutes is encouraging. See Final
Report, supra note 32, at 10; see also supra text accompanying note 60.
199. The nine pesticides on the current "dirty dozen" list of POPs (aldrin, dieldrin,
DDT, endrin, chlordane, hexachlorobenzene, mirex, toxaphene, and heptachlor) are
chemical compounds known as organochlorines. Better Alternatives, supra note 6, at 3;
see also MARION MOSES, DESIGNER POISONS, How TO PROTECT YOUR HEALrH AND HOME
FROM Toxic PESTICIDES 41, 43-44 (1995) (describing chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides,
also known as organochlorines) [hereinafter "DESIGNER POISONS"]; STEINGRABER, supra
note 9, at 112-14 (discussing the chemical composition, modes of action, and effects of
certain organochlorines); Pesticides, supra note 9, at 482. See supra text accompanying
note 54 for a list of the twelve POPs. Environmental NGOs such as PAN fear that even
if the POPs convention halts the production of these pesticides, chemical companies will
replace them with toxic pesticides of the organophosphate, carbamate, or pyrethroid
family. Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note 76. Organophosphates and car-
bamates are acutely toxic compounds which attack the brain and nervous system but do
not accumulate in the body; these pesticides are known as nerve-gas type pesticides and
are considered more acutely toxic than organochlorines. Better Alternatives, supra note
[Vol. 20:855
Reclaiming Our Future
One major difference between the Montreal Protocol and the current
POPs negotiations lies in the structure of the chemical industries in-
volved. In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the ODS-producing indus-
try is dominated by a mere handful of representatives; thus, it has been
able to exercise considerable influence in the debate regarding whether
chemical substitutes should be used.70° In contrast, POPs are produced
by a vast and diverse array of manufacturers;2 31 therefore, it may not be
6, at 7; DESIGNER POISONS, supra, at 44-47; Pesticides, supra note 9, at 481-82. A Ger-
man company introduced the first organophosphate poisons (nerve gases) during World
War II by testing them on prisoners in concentration camps. STEINGRABER, supra note 9,
at 94. Pyrethroids are compounds that also attack the brain and nervous system but are
usually less toxic than organophosphates and carbamates; they do not accumulate in the
body but may cause vomiting, diarrhea, tremor, irritability, or severe reactions in people
with asthma. DESIGNER POISONS, supra, at 47-48. Thus, the health risks posed by po-
tential chemical substitutes are no less severe than those of the listed POPs.
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, the parties initially agreed to phase out the produc-
tion of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Montreal Protocol, supra note 127, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
In later amendments, however, the parties agreed to phase out hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs), the primary substitutes for CFCs, due to scientific evidence that they, too, de-
pleted the ozone layer. Copenhagen Amendments, supra note 127, 32 I.L.M. 874; see
BiERMANN, supra note 108, at 34-35; MENDING THE OZONE HOLE, supra note 184, at 224-
27 (discussing the scheduled phaseouts under the Montreal Protocol, as amended). Hy-
drofluorocarbons (HFCs) are another family of chemical substitutes for CFCs and have
been found to contribute to global climate change, resulting in efforts to reduce emis-
sions in the United States. See Barbara A. Boczar, Avenues for Direct Participation of
Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Negotiations, 3 N.Y.U.
ENvTL. L.J. 1, 29-30; Climate Change: Clinton Says Plan Will Create Jobs, Cut Deficit,
Protect Environment, 17 CHEM. REG. REP. 1326 (1993); Ozone Depletion: Tensions Be-
tiveen Ozone Protection, Climate Change Emerging in Policy, 17 CHE.m. REG. REP. 1320
(1993). For a chart demonstrating the uses and potential environmental effects of certain
CFCs, HCFCs, and HFCs, see BENEDICK, supra note 184, at 16-17.
200. See BMIANN, supra note 108, at 65 (stating that "[i]n the case of the ozone re-
gime, ninety-five per cent of all chlorofluorocarbon production occurred under the juris-
diction of only four actors .... "); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the chemical industry's influence over the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral
Fund).
201. The agrochemical industry is dominated by a handful of companies. See THE
PESTICIDE TRAIL, supra note 29, at 25 (stating that in 1992 fifteen companies controlled
86% of the global pesticide market and in 1993 twelve controlled 75%). However, POPs
do not consist of pesticides alone. Dioxins and furans, for instance, are industrial by-
products that span various industries. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47. Ad-
ditionally, although there may be a handful of powerful chemical companies in devel-
oped countries who dominate production of certain POPs, when a particular substance is
banned in some countries, it is very common for private pesticide formulators to emerge
in LDCs where no enforced ban exists and sell them directly to farmers. Paarlberg, supra
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as easy for those industry interests to exert influence in favor of chemical
202substitutes. It is an open question as to whether the diversity of the
chemical production market will be a positive or negative factor in nego-
tiating the POPs agreement.
Some view the debate between chemical substitutes and non-
chemical alternatives as a debate between a plan motivated by short-term
profit and one that looks toward long-term solutions. °3 Given the com-
peting interests involved, it remains to be seen which type of substitutes
will be advocated in the final draft of the POPs agreement
204
VI. Conclusion
POPs continue to harm the health of humans, animals, and the envi-
ronment and pose a major threat to global biodiversity. Further research
is needed to identify how POPs operate, to add additional POPs to the
list of harmful substances, and to determine how the world can best pro-
tect itself against the dangers posed by POPs. In recognition of the
mounting evidence regarding the harmful effects of POPs, major inter-
national steps are now being taken to address the problem. The con-
certed international commitment to curtailing and eliminating the POPs
threat is demonstrated by the recent agreement reached at the IFCS
meeting in Manila, followed by UNEP's adoption of the IFCS's recom-
mendations. The next step will be to establish the negotiating committee
(INC), which is scheduled to begin drafting the POPs instrument in early
1998.
note 8, at 311-12. See also supra text accompanying notes 169-71 (discussing a poten-
tial black market in banned POPs); supra text accompanying notes 28-33 (demonstrating
the incidence of exports of banned substances to LDCs).
202. But see supra note 199 (regarding potential chemical substitutes, which remain a
dangerous possibility).
203. See, e.g., Boczar, supra note 199, at 30 (asserting that the problems of chemical
alternatives employed by manufacturers as a result of the Montreal Protocol could have
been avoided if the negotiators of the agreement had agreed to develop ,dternatives that
would be useful in the long run).
204. See Final Report, supra note 32, at 9-10. Although the Final Report implies that
non-chemical alternatives might be preferable to chemical alternatives that may harm
human health and the environment, this issue is likely to be a major negotiating point at
the INC sessions. Id. at 10; Telephone Interview with Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, supra note
61; see supra text accompanying note 60.
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Formulating the appropriate multilateral approach to the POPs
problem remains controversial. Various outstanding issues must be ad-
dressed in order to create an effective agreement, particularly those
dealing with allocating responsibility among industrialized and less de-
veloped nations, scientific criteria and measures to add to the list of the
"dirty dozen," and alternatives to POPs. To this end, certain elements of
the Montreal Protocol, both its successes and its perceived failures, may
be a useful model for the proposed POPs agreement.
The momentum generated by the IFCS recommendations, if acted
upon expeditiously by the world community, may lead to the successful
phasing out of harmful POPs. The agreements reached thus far are en-
couraging and point toward the creation of an international convention to
phase out POPs that will be legally binding on the parties.
Thirty-five years ago, the subject of the alarming effects of man-
made chemicals on the environment and human health was eloquently
brought to public attention by Rachel Carson in Silent Springy 5 Al-
though the debate as to the extent of the damage caused by POPs is likely
to continue for some time, the consequence of doing nothing is a risk that
no one is willing to take, for it is a gamble on our future.
205. See generally CARSON, supra note 7.
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